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I. INTRODUCTION
Although abortion is legal, seven states currently criminalize self-induced abortion,1
and many other states criminalize activities associated with it.2 Self-induced abortion is
³>W@KH SUDFWLFH RI VHOI-administering pharmaceutical pills, traditional herbs, or other
PHDQV´WRXQGHUJRDERUWLRQRXWVLGHRIDFOLQLFDOVHWWLQJ3 However, the term self-induced
abortion is somewhat of a misnomer because an individual who self-induces may receive
assistance from a caregiver such as a friend or family member. While courts recognize the
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWWRSUHJQDQF\WHUPLQDWLRQDERUWLRQ¶VXQLTXHOegal history has relegated
the lawful practice of abortion solely to the medical industry.4 As a result, those who assist
with self-induced abortion as caregivers have limited legal recourse when they are
confronted with criminal charges. But what is the oXWFRPHZKHQRQH¶VUHOLJLRQDQGIDLWK
motivates caregiving for self-induced abortion? This law review comment examines
religious exercise in the context of self-induced abortion, ultimately demonstrating that
caregivers who act from a religious or spiritual perspective can likely assert state Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) as a defense if they are charged with a crime such as
the unauthorized practice of medicine.
Religious freedom laws are often associated with socially conservative political
agendas.5 Yet, they also expand religious exercise protections for those whose beliefs are
QRW QHFHVVDULO\ ³DFFHSWDEOH ORJLFDO FRQVLVWHQW RU FRPSUHKHQVLEOH WR RWKHUV´ 6 Indeed,
asserting that religious or spiritual beliefs can motivate caregiving in the case of self-

1. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3604; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 652; IDAHO CODE § 18-606(2); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.220; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-733; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21 § 862; S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80(b); see also Letter from Farah Diaz-Tello, Senior Counsel, SelfInduced Abortion Legal Team, & Cynthia Soohoo, Director, Human Rights and Gender Justice Clinic, City
University of New York School of Law to U.N. Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law and
Practice -XQH >KHUHLQDIWHU³/HWWHUWR81:RUNLQJ*URXS´@ RQILOHZLWKDuthor).
2. See infra Part IV.A.2; see also Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 8.
3. Jill E. Adams & Melissa Mikesell, Primer on Self-Induced Abortion, THE SIA LEGAL TEAM,
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/aa251a_8ff3236264b54fed955aa99c0ea7ca59.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165±   KROGLQJ ³>W@KH GHFLVLRQ YLQGLFDWHV WKH ULJKW RI WKH
physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to points where important
VWDWHLQWHUHVWVSURYLGHFRPSHOOLQJMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRULQWHUYHQWLRQ´ id. at 113, 116±17, 120±21, 162, 163; see also
discussion infra Part IV.A and notes 165±70.
5. S. POVERTY L. CTR., µ5ELIGIOUS LIBERTY¶ AND THE ANTI-LGBT RIGHT 3±4 (2016); see Tom Gjelten,
Conservatives Call for ‘Religious Freedom,’ But for Whom?, NPR: RELIGION (Dec. 11, 2015) (stating that
several of the 2015 conservative political candidates used religious freedom as a platform),
https://www.npr.org/2015/12/11/458969192/conservatives-call-for-religious-freedom-but-for-whom.
6. Cf. 7KRPDVY5HY%GRIWKH,QG(PS¶W6HF'LY, 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (directly referencing the
Thomas decision in its most recent federal RFRA analysis, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682,
724 (2014), the Supreme Court affirmed that under RFRA courts cannot determine the reasonableness of an
LQGLYLGXDO¶VUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIV).
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induced abortion may seem incomprehensible. Nevertheless, the issue is worth exploring
because caregiving is a centuries-old practice that still occurs today.7 In addition, evidence
that religion and abortion are not inherently at odds is widely available. Some
congregational and spiritual leaders are trained in pastoral care for abortion and offer
support to laypeople who are seeking abortion. 8 In addition, a majority of in-clinic abortion
patients identify with a religious practice.9 Further, some doctors have stated that they will
perform abortions because of their religion.10 Thus, the assertion that self-induced abortion
may occur within a religious or spiritual context has substantial support: research indicates
that individuals still choose to self-induce and that religious individuals and spiritual
leaders take part in abortion practices.11
While there are HPSLULFDO GDWD FDWDORJXLQJ GRPLQDQW IDLWK JURXSV¶ YLews on
abortion, there is little research regarding the intersection of religious practice and abortion
outside of clinical settings.12 Moreover, there is no legal scholarship identifying how selfinduced abortion may relate to religious practice and how it may be protected by state
RFRAs. This comment examines how religion may motivate caregiving for self-induced
abortion and considers whether a state RFRA can provide an adequate defense for a
caregiver facing criminal charges.
State RFRAs provide a potential defense for caregivers because they typically offer
greater protections for religious exercise than the First Amendment.13 Many RFRAs
require courts to apply strict scrutiny²if a state substantially burdens religiouslymotivated criminal activity, a state must prove that it has a compelling interest in doing
VRHYHQLIDVWDWH¶VDFWLRQUHVXOWVIURPDODZWKDWLVQHXWUDOWRZDUGUHOLJLRQDQGJHQHUDOO\
applicable to everyone.14 Further, a state must demonstrate that imposing the substantial
burden is the least restrictive means of advancing its compelling interest.
To explain the differences between religious exercise protections under the Free
7. See KATI SCHINDLER ET AL., NATIVE AM. WOMEN¶S HEALTH EDUC. RES. CTR., INDIGENOUS WOMEN¶S
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 2 (2002); Molly Dutton-Kenny, Part II: The Historical Legacy of Midwives as Abortion
Providers in the United States, SQUAT BIRTH J. 21 (Winter 2013-2014); LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION
WAS A CRIME 6, 9±10 (1997).
8. Pastoral Care Training, RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR REPROD. CHOICE, http://rcrc.org/pastoral-care/ (last
visited Sept. 7, 2017).
9. Jenna Jerman & Rachel K. Jones et al., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION
PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008 1, 7 (May 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/characteristic
s-us-abortion-patients-2014.
10. DR. WILLIE PARKER, LIFE¶S WORK: A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR CHOICE 2 (2017). See Rebecca Luckett,
I’m a Catholic obstetrician who had an abortion. This is not politics or religion. It’s life., USA TODAY (Mar. 19,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/03/19/catholic-obstetrician-who-had-abortion-not-politic
s-religion-its-life-rebecca-luckett-column/416614002/ (stating that because her Catholic education centered
HPSDWK\LWDOVRSUHSDUHGKHUIRUKHU³ILUVWHQFRXQWHUZLWKDSDWLHQWZKRQHHGHGDQDERUWLRQ´ 
11. D. GROSSMAN & K. WHITE ET AL., TEX. POL¶Y EVALUATION PROJECT, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION, AND
EXPERIENCE RELATED TO ABORTION SELF-INDUCTION IN TEXAS 1, 2 (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/txpep/_files/pdf/TxPEP-Research-Brief-KnowledgeOpinionExperience.pdf.
12. Very Few Americans See Contraception as Morally Wrong, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/09/28/4-very-few-americans-see-contraception-as-morally-wrong.
13. Compare 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 447 (2018), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, IND. CODE §
34-13-9-9, and Tyms-Bey v. State, 69 N.E.3d 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
14. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15; IDAHO
CODE § 73-402; IND. CODE § 34-13-9-8.
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Exercise Clause and state RFRAs, Part II of this comment briefly examines twentiethcentury applications of free exercise jurisprudence and describes the environment in which
state RFRAs emerged. When Congress enacted the federal RFRA, it intended to codify
the application of strict scrutiny to laws of general applicability if those laws imposed
substantial burdens on religious exercise. Although the federal RFRA was invalidated as
DSSOLHGWRWKHVWDWHVOHJLVODWXUHVHQDFWHGVWDWH5)5$VDQGNHSWLQPLQG&RQJUHVV¶VLQWHQW
Thus, Part II introduces why state RFRAs might provide better protections for caregivers
as opposed to a traditional First Amendment claim.
3DUW,,,EXLOGVRQWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIVWDWH5)5$V¶H[SDQVLYHSURWHFWLRQVIRUreligious
exercise. Specifically, Part III acknowledges the complicated nature of applying state
RFRAs, particularly in the context of criminal justice. Generally, state RFRA claims are
infrequent and, in most states, local RFRA case law related to criminal charges is lacking.
,QDGGLWLRQHDFKVWDWH¶V5)5$LVXQLTXHO\GUDIWHG7KXVVWDWHFRXUWVKDYHOLWWOHJXLGDQce
for interpreting and applying RFRA statutes and often look for guidance from federal
sources of authority. 15 Acknowledging these difficulties, Part III posits that when a
caregiver is charged with a crime because she assists others with self-induced abortion,
state courts could likely adopt the federal RFRA application outlined in the Supreme
&RXUW¶V Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. decision. Part III also describes why the
federal RFRA analysis in Hobby Lobby is likely the most advantageous interpretation for
caregivers asserting a RFRA defense.
Part IV addresses whether a state RFRA is ultimately a viable defense for a
caregiver. Although most states do not explicitly criminalize self-induced abortion, law
enforcement and prosecutors sometimes charge caregivers with criminal statutes
associated with protecting public health and safety, such as the unauthorized practice of
medicine.16 In the wake of criminal prosecutions for self-induced abortion and caregiving,
Part IV applies the RFRA analysis of Hobby Lobby to instances when a caregiver assists
with self-induced abortion in her capacity as a religious or spiritual leader. By applying
the Hobby Lobby analysis, a caregiver is able to successfully assert a state RFRA as a
defense to criminal charges becauVHWKH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI religious exercise and
substantial burden in Hobby Lobby are quite broad. Moreover, the Hobby Lobby ruling
requires states to provide conclusive evidence that the substantial burdens they impose on
religious exercise are the least restrictive means of doing so. Accordingly, Part IV
concludes that the prosecution of caregivers is not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict
scrutiny.17

15. See Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 490; State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 733 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013).
16. See infra Part IV.A.2.
17. Brian L. Porto, Background, Summary, and Comment, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 116 A.L.R. 5th 233 § 2 (2004).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/8

4

Rush: Religious Freedom and Self-Induced Abortion

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

2019]

495

II. STATE RFRAS EMERGE FROM TRADITIONAL FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Twentieth-Century Applications of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
1. The Supreme Court Adopts Strict Scrutiny
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court provided that the Free Exercise
Clause only protected religious belief and not religiously-motivated actions.18 For
LQVWDQFH GXULQJ WKH ODWH ¶V WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW KHDUG D VHULHV RI FDVHV UHJDUGLQJ
polygamy and held that some religious actions were not protected under the Free Exercise
Clause.19 +RZHYHU WKH &RXUW¶V VWDQFH RQ IUHH H[HUFLse began to shift near the midtwentieth century. In 1940, the Court decided Cantwell v. Connecticut, where it clarified
its stance on religious exercise by incorporating the Free Exercise Clause into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 As a result, religious exercise was
officially recognized as a fundamental right and its protection was applicable to both the
states and the federal government.21
Once the Court ruled the Free Exercise Clause applied to the states, protections for
religiously-motivated behavior began to emerge in a piecemeal fashion. Slowly, the Court
introduced strict scrutiny and applied it to neutral laws of general applicability in religious
exercise cases. In 1944, just four years after the Cantwell decision, the Court held that
VWDWHVKDGWKHDXWKRULW\WRTXHVWLRQWKHVLQFHULW\RIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVEXW
that states did not have the power to scrutinize the truth or the validity of such beliefs. 22
*RLQJIXUWKHULQWKH&RXUWEHJDQWRDSSO\WKH³OHDVWUHVWULFWLYHPHDQV´WHVWRIVWULFW
scrutiny to religious exercise violations. Justice Warren held that a state could impose
EXUGHQVRQUHOLJLRXVH[HUFLVHLILWZDVDWWHPSWLQJWRDGYDQFHWKHVWDWH¶VVHFXODUJRDOVDQG
did not have another, less restrictive statutory scheme to do so.23
Although the decisions following Cantwell forged a path for subjecting free exercise
claims to strict scrutiny, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general
applicability until it heard Sherbert v. Verner in 1963.24 In Sherbert, an individual
challenged a South Carolina law after she was denied unemployment benefits. Under the
law, the state denied her unemployment benefits because she refused to work on
Saturday²a work requirement that conflicted with her religious beliefs.25 On review, the
&RXUWUHIXVHGWRJLYHGHIHUHQFHWRWKHVWDWH¶VUHDVRQLQJIRUYLRODWLQJWKHFODLPDQW¶VIUHH
exercise.26 ,QVWHDG -XVWLFH %UHQQDQ¶V PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ DUWLFXODWHG WKH QHFHVVLW\ RI
18. PEW RES. CTR., A DELICATE BALANCE: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 2±3
(Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance-the-free-exercise-clause-and-thesupreme-court [hereinafter DELICATE BALANCE].
19. Id.
20. See 310 U.S. 296, 302 (1940).
21. DELICATE BALANCE, supra note 18, at 4.
22. Id. at 5±6.
23. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606±07 (1961).
24. See 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1248 (3d ed. 2006).
25. 374 U.S. at 401.
26. Id. at 403±04.
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applying strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general applicability when a restriction on
religious exercise was in question.27 Most notably, the majority held that the directness of
WKHEXUGHQRQRQH¶VUHOLJLRQZDVLUUHOHYDQWZKHQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI
the law was unconstitutional.28 Thus, even laws that only indirectly or incidentally
burdened free exercise were subject to strict scrutiny. 29 The Sherbert ruling was a
watershed moment in the protection of religious exercise for two reasons. First, prior to
Sherbert, strict scrutiny had only been fully applied to laws challenged under free speech
or racial discrimination claims.30 Second, the Sherbert ruling directly informed the intent
and drafting process of the federal and state RFRAs.
2. The Supreme Court Rejects Strict Scrutiny
Despite the initial application of strict scrutiny to religious exercise cases, the Court
regularly refused to apply it to First Amendment claims, or when the Court did, it only
infrequently sided with claimants.31 For instance, in Bob Jones University v. United States,
the university challenged an IRS restriction that denied tax-exempt status to educational
entities with racially discriminatory policies. 32 8QGHUWKHFKDOOHQJHWKH&RXUW³UHMHFWHG
WKHXQLYHUVLW\¶VFODLPGLVSHQVLQJZLWKWKHGHWDLOHGEDODQFLQJWHVWXVHd in Sherbert . . . ´33
The Bob Jones University decision echoed previous Court opinions regarding the
application of strict scrutiny to religious exercise claims. Thus, deference to states
continued throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, as the Court typically only
protected religiously-motivated conduct in a limited number of circumstances. 34
,Q KLQGVLJKW WKH &RXUW¶V HYHQWXDO UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH Sherbert ruling comes as no
VXUSULVHEHFDXVHPDQ\RIWKH&RXUW¶VOHDGLQJGHFLVLRQVLQGLFDWHGDQDSSUehension to apply
strict scrutiny to laws challenged under the Free Exercise Clause. The 1990 decision in
Employment Division v. Smith marked the official declaration of Sherbert’s end as applied
to First Amendment claims. In Smith, claimants were terminated from employment for
their ceremonial use of peyote in a Native American Church ceremony.35 When the
claimants filed for unemployment benefits they were denied because the sacramental use
of peyote YLRODWHG 2UHJRQ¶V FULPLQDO FRGH ZKLFK constituted work misconduct.36 The
FODLPDQWV DUJXHG WKDW WKH VWDWH¶V IDLOXUH WR H[HPSW WKH UHOLJLRXV XVH RI SH\RWH IURP

27. Id. at 406±07.
28. Id. at 403±04.
29. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 516, 607 (1961)).
30. DELICATE BALANCE, supra note 18, at 7.
31. See, e.g.*ROGPDQY:HLQEHUJHU86   KROGLQJWKDW³UHYLHZRIPLOLWDU\UHJXODWLRQV
FKDOOHQJHGRQ)LUVW$PHQGPHQWJURXQGV´GRHVQRWUHFHLYHVWULFWVFUXWLQ\ 7RQ\ 6XVDQ$ODPR)RXQGY6HF¶\
of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303±05 (1985). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 1248.
32. See 461 U.S. 574, 574 (1983).
33. DELICATE BALANCE, supra note 18, at 9.
34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, DW  &KHPHULQVN\ VWDWHV WKDW WKH &RXUW RQO\ ³XSKHOG IUHH H[HUFLVH
FODXVHFKDOOHQJHV´LQWZRDUHDV Id. First, the Court upheld challenges to statutes requiring school attendance. Id.
6HFRQG WKH &RXUW VWUXFN GRZQ VWDWXWHV WKDW GHQLHG EHQHILWV WRLQGLYLGXDOV ZKR ³TXLW WKHLU MREV IRU UHOLJLRXV
UHDVRQV´Id.
35. (PS¶W'LYv. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
36. Id.
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2UHJRQ¶V laws was unconstitutional. However, the Court held that Sherbert was
inapplicable.37 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia articulated that neutral laws of
general applicability could not be subject to strict scrutiny when the prohibition of the
exercise of religion was only an indirect or incidental result of the laws. 38 7KH&RXUW¶V
decision shocked lower courts and legal scholars, and it provoked significant protest from
religious rights groups and civil liberties organizations. 39
B. The Smith and Flores Rulings Catalyzed Congress and State Legislatures to Pass
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
'LVSOHDVHGZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJLQSmith, Congress intentionally diverged from
the Smith decision when it enacted the federal RFRA and codified strict scrutiny for
religious exercise claims.40 In referencing Smith &RQJUHVV VWDWHG WKH UXOLQJ ³YLUWXDOO\
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
LPSRVHGE\ODZVQHXWUDOWRZDUGUHOLJLRQ´41 In comparison, Congress found that because
religious H[HUFLVHLVDQ³XQDOLHQDEOHULJKW . ODZVµQHXWUDO¶WRZDUGUHOLJLRQPD\EXUGHQ
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with [it]´42 Congress also
DGYRFDWHGIRUDEURDGDSSOLFDWLRQRI5)5$ZKHQLWVWDWHGWKDW5)5$VKRXOGDSSO\WR³DOO
FDVHV´ZKHUHDQLQGLYLGXDODOOHJHVDVXEVWDQWLDOEXUGHQRQWKHIUHHH[HUFLVHRIUHOLJLRQ 43
As a result, the federal RFRA effectively guaranteed the application of strict scrutiny to
religious exercise claims that challenged laws traditionally considered generally applicable
and neutral toward religion.44
Despite the enactment of the federal RFRA, its application to local state actions was
relatively short-lived. In 1997, the Supreme Court heard City of Boerne v. Flores.45 In
Boerne, an archbishop challenged a zoning ordinance under RFRA after municipal
authorities denied him a permit to expand a church building.46 On review, the Supreme
Court ruled the federal RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state laws and local
governments.47 7KH&RXUWGHVFULEHG&RQJUHVV¶VDFWDVD³VZHHSLQJ . . intrusion at every
OHYHORIJRYHUQPHQW´48 When it enacted the federal RFRA, Congress exceeded its scope
RIDXWKRULW\EHFDXVHLWDOWHUHGWKHPHDQLQJRIWKH)LUVW$PHQGPHQW¶VIUHHH[HUFLVHFODXVH 49
37. Id. at 882±84.
38. Id. at 872, 878.
39. PEW RES. CTR., The Smith Decision (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicatebalance6.
40. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religiouspractices.html?mcubz=0&mcubz=0.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
42. Id. at § 2000bb(a)(1)±(2).
43. Id.
44. Mary L. Topliff, Summary and Comment ± Generally, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.), 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (1996).
45. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
46. Id. at 507.
47. Id. at 508, 536.
48. Id. at 532.
49. Id. at 508.
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In contrast, the Court held that Congress may only enforce a pre-existing constitutional
right as permitted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.50 Thus, although the federal
RFRA remains applicable to claims and defenses against federal statutes, it is no longer
applied to religious freedom claims or challenges to state laws.
Although the Boerne ruling invalidated the federal RFRA, many state legislatures
and courts have enacted legislation or decided cases in favor of religious exercise.51
Between 1993 and 1997, only two states emulated the federal RFRA: Connecticut and
Rhode Island.52 But since the Boerne decision, nearly half of the states have enacted
RFRAs or similar religious freedom laws that expand religious exercise protections.53 Of
those states, five have statutes or state constitutional amendments that afford incredibly
EURDG SURWHFWLRQV EHFDXVH WKH\ ³GR QRW UHTXLre the burden or restriction on religious
H[HUFLVH WR EH VXEVWDQWLDO´54 Further, some courts in states without RFRAs sometimes
broadly construe the religious freedom provisions of state constitutions to increase the
protection of free exercise.55
III. STATE INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF RFRAS
A. Applying State RFRAs in a Criminal Defense Context Presents Complex Issues of
Statutory Interpretation
1. Many Factors Problematize Asserting a State RFRA as a Defense to Criminal
Charges
Due to the discriminatory nature of recent RFRA claims,56 much of the discussion
50. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.
51. See 2016 State Religious Freedom Restoration Act Legislation, NAT¶L CONF. OF ST. LEGS. (Dec. 31,
2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2016-state-religious-freedom-restoration-actlegislation.aspx.
52. Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Legisbrief, NAT¶L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, Vol. 23, No. (May
 >KHUHLQDIWHU³RFRA Legisbrief´@
53. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-401; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5301; Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT¶L CONF.
OF ST. LEGS. (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/religious-freedomrestoration-acts-lb.aspx.
54. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01, § III; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-3, 28-22-5; MO. REV. STAT. §
1.302(1)(2); RFRA Legisbrief, supra note 52.
55. Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 164
(2016) [hereinafter RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities]; Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 466±67 (2010) [hereinafter A Look at State RFRAs]. See
generally Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POLIC¶Y 103, 103, 186±87 (2013) (concluding that some state courts interpret state
constitutions according to pre-Smith rulings, thereby providing greater protection for free exercise claims than
current First Amendment federal case law).
56. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 683±84 (2014) (holding that for-profit
corporations were included under the definition of person for the purposes of RFRA). Further, although no state
RFRA claims were involved in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., a cake shop asserted that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment after it penalized him for refusing
to provide services to a same-sex couple that requested a wedding cake. Craig, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015).
See also Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013) (where plaintiff-photographers
asserted a violation of free exercise after they refused to provide a same-sex couple with wedding photography
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regarding the federal Act and state RFRAs understandably centers on how religious pretext
is used to harm the LGBTQ community and women.57 Yet, state RFRA jurisprudence is
relatively scant.58 A more in-depth look at the use of state RFRAs reveals that there is not
an abundance of state RFRA cases.59 For instance, three states²Oklahoma, Idaho, and
New Mexico²enacted state religious freedom laws mirroring the federal RFRA in 2000.60
But in the last seventeen years, Oklahoma courts have adjudicated only three RFRA
cases.61 Likewise, Idaho and New Mexico courts have each only reviewed five RFRA
claims.62 Additional research also indicates that states with considerable RFRA case law
are the exception to the general rule that state RFRAs are not often litigated.63
Of the existing RFRA case law available, there is a particularly limited number of
decisions in which a defendant asserted a state RFRA as a criminal defense. Of the thirteen
cases referenced above, only three involved RFRA as a criminal defense. 64 Two of the
three RFRA criminal defense cases were reviewed in Idaho, 65 while the other was heard
in New Mexico.66 +RZHYHU,QGLDQD¶VSRVLWLRQDPRQJ5)5$VWDWHVLVQRWDEOH$OWKRXJK
an explanation is absent, the Indiana RFRA statute is used frequently as a criminal
defense.67 Yet, records indicate that the Indiana Court of Appeals has heard only one
RFRA criminal defense case since the Indiana legislature enacted the law in 2015. 68
VHUYLFHV DQG WKH 1HZ 0H[LFR +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLVVLRQ KHOG WKH SODLQWLIIV KDG YLRODWHG 1HZ 0H[LFR¶V
discrimination laws).
57. See, e.g., Louise Melling, ACLU: Why we can no longer support the federal ‘religious freedom’ law,
WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abusedreligious-freedom-restoration-act/2015/06/25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92c75ae6ab94b5_story.html?utm_term=.9af163a505e0; Katy Steinmetz, The Debate Over What Indiana’s
Religious Freedom Act is Really About, TIME (Mar. 30, 2015), http://time.com/3764347/indiana-religiousfreedom-discrimination-act; Emma Green, Gay Rights May Come at the Cost of Religious Freedom, ATLANTIC
(Jul. 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/legal-rights-lgbt-discrimination-religiousfreedom-claims/399278.
58. RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, supra note 55, at 164; A Look at State RFRAs, supra note
DW DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDW³>V@WDWHFRXUWFDVHVSDUWLFXODUO\DWWKHWULDOOHYHODUHKDUGWRILQG´DQGWKDWVWDWH
RFRAs likely increase favorable settlements for religious claimants).
59. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 480.
60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 251; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1; IDAHO CODE § 73-402.
61. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (E.D. Okla. 2008); Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d
 2NOD&LY$SS %HDFKY2NOD'HS¶WRI3XE6DIHW\3G, 2 (Okla. 2017).
62. See Olsen v. Idaho St. Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2004); Roles v. Townsend, 64 P.3d 338,
 ,GDKR /HZLVY6W'HS¶WRI7UDQVS3G ,GDKR 6tate v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d
730, 732 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1219 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011). See, e.g., Ross v.
Bd. of Regents of the U. of N.M., 599 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2010); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,
309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013); St. ex rel. Peterson v. Aramark Corr. Servs., 321 P.3d 128, 131, 137±38 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2014); State v. Bent, 328 P.3d 677, 678 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
63. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 479±80.
64. See Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 731; White, 271 P.3d at 1219; Bent, 328 P.3d at 678.
65. See Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 730±31; White, 271 P.3d 1217.
66. See Bent, 328 P.3d 677.
67. Josh Sanburn, How Indiana’s Religious Freedom Law is Being Used to Defend Child Abuse and Other
Crimes, TIME (Sept. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4481073/indiana-rfra-law-child-abuse. See generally Maya
Rhodan, Indiana Religious Freedom Law Breeds ‘First Church of Cannabis,’ TIME (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://time.com/3764983/indiana-religious-freedom-law-breeds-first-church-of-cannabis/?iid=sr-link8
(discussing the creation of the First Church of Cannabis, which uses the illegal substance cannabis as a sacrament,
DIWHU,QGLDQD¶V5)5$ZDVHQDFWHG 
68. Tyms-Bey v. State, 69 N.E.3d 488, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
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Even among the anomalous states with frequent local RFRA litigation, the number
of instances where RFRAs are used as a criminal defense is incredibly low. In 1998,
Illinois enacted its particularly broad RFRA, 69 which allows a claimant to challenge any
state law or regulation and provides that RFRA may be used as a criminal defense.70 Since
WKH,OOLQRLV5)5$¶VHQDFWPHQW,OOLQRLVFRXUWVKDYHVHHQDWOHDVWWKLUWHHQ5)5$FDVHV 71
+RZHYHU QRQH RI WKRVH FDVHV LQYROYHG WKH ,OOLQRLV 5)5$¶V XVH DV D FULPLQDO GHIHQVH
Similarly, Texas enacted its RFRA in 1999,72 EXW QRQH RI 7H[DV¶V 5)5$ FDVHV KDYH
LQYROYHGWKHVWDWH¶V5)5$DVDFULPLQDOGHIHQVH73 Not surprisingly, there are no available
opinions discussing whether a state RFRA is a viable defense for a caregiver who assists
others with self-induced abortion.
The lack of state RFRA criminal defense cases does not have a simple explanation.
For instance, on the rare occasions when defendants do assert a RFRA as a defense, the
plea-bargaining process may influence its use in further prosecution. 74 In addition, some
states limit the use of their RFRAs under certain circumstances. 75 Although some states
SURYLGHWKDWWKHLU5)5$VPD\EHXVHGWRFKDOOHQJH³DOOVWDWHODZVDQGORFDORUGLQDQFHV´ 76
other states expressly exempt the application of RFRA to certain laws that might otherwise
be violated due to a bona fide religious practice.77 In Florida, a claimant cannot assert the
VWDWH¶V5)5$DVDGHIHQVHWRGUXJ-related charges.78 ,QDGGLWLRQ3HQQV\OYDQLD¶V5)5$LV
not available to defendants whose religion may motivate or require them to violate existing
provisions regarding health, safety, or licenses to practice medicine. 79
The lack of uniformity in applying strict scrutiny to RFRA claims and defenses also
exacerbates the uncertainty of using a RFRA as a criminal defense. Although a significant
69. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15.
70. Id. at 35/25.
71. See, e.g., World Outreach Conf. Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller,
570 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2009); Fam. Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 991±92 (N.D. Ill.
2008); Marcavage v. City of Chi., 467 F. Supp.2d 823, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2006). See generally Irshad Learning Ctr.
Y&W\RI'XSDJH)6XSSG 1',OO  KROGLQJWKDW,UVKDG¶VIUHHH[HUFLVHZDVVXEVWDQWLDOO\
burdened under the Illinois RFRA); Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143 (Ill.
$SS  KROGLQJWKDWWKHFLW\¶V]RQLQJRUGLQDQFHGLGQRWYLRODWHWKH,OOLQRLV5)5$HYHQWKRXJKLWSUHYHQWHG
the Church from building a new addition to its facilities).
72. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001.
73. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 289 (Tex. 2009); Christian Acad. of Abilene v. City of
$ELOHQH6:G 7H[$SS %DODZDMGHUY7H['HS¶WRI&ULP-XVW,QVWLWXWLRQDO'LY
S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex. App. 2006); Walters v. Livingston, 519 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App. 2017); Scott v. State,
80 S.W.3d 184, 187± 7H[$SS /LOO\Y7H['HS¶WRI&ULP-XVW6:G 7H[$SS.
2015); Emack v. State, 354 S.W.3d 828, 839 (Tex. App. 2011).
74. See generally Vic Ryckaert, Mom who cited religious freedom pleads guilty, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Oct.
28, 2016), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2016/10/28/mom-who-cited-religious-freedom-pleadguilty-abuse/92876808 (stating that a mother who initially cited religious freedom as a defense in a child abuse
prosecution pled guilty to battery, reducing her felony charge to a misdemeanor).
75. )RULQVWDQFH7H[DV¶V5)5$LPSRVHVVWULFWVFUXWLQ\RQDIUHHLQGLYLGXDOFKDOOHQJLQJDVWDWH¶VDFWLRQODZ
or regulation. However, the Texas RFRA operates differently for incarcerated people. In Texas, penological
interests are automatically presumed to be compelling, thus the evidentiary burden of rebutting the compelling
state interest shifts to the claimant. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 491.
76. IDAHO CODE § 73-403; see also 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/25; IND. CODE § 34-13-9-1.
77. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 492.
78. Id.
79. 71 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 2406(b)(3), (6).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/8

10

Rush: Religious Freedom and Self-Induced Abortion

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

2019]

501

number of states have codified the use of strict scrutiny for religious exercise claims, each
VWDWH¶V5)5$LVXQLTXHO\GUDIWHGDQGDSSOLHG80 For instance, some states only require a
plaintiff to demonstrate a burden on the exercise of religion, while others require a plaintiff
WR GHPRQVWUDWH D ³VXEVWDQWLDO EXUGHQ´81 Further, when analyzing whether a burden is
substantial, some courts still look to First Amendment jurisprudence. 82 Applying a First
Amendment analysis to RFRA claims or defenses is inherently problematic because, since
the Smith ruling, First Amendment challenges cannot withstand laws that do not directly
target religious conduct. 83 In contrast, state RFRAs were introduced and enacted to impose
strict scrutiny on government actions alleged to violate free exercise.84
In addition to differing applications of RFRAs across state courts, state courts even
disagree on the threshold requirements for showing a substantial burden. How courts
analyze substantial burdens is particularly important when determining RFRA violations
because a such determination controls whether the burden of proof shifts to the
government.85 For example, in a criminal case where a self-induced abortion caregiver is
charged with the unauthorized practice of medicine, the state is not required to demonstrate
that the law satisfies a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest until the caregiver first meets her evidentiary burden² that the
application (i.e., charge) of the unauthorized practice of medicine imposes a substantial
burden on the exercise of her religion.86
2. Applying State RFRAs in Criminal Defense Cases Requires Courts to Rely on
Federal Sources of Authority
When an individual asserts a state RFRA as a criminal defense, some state courts
apply civil and criminal interpretations of the federal RFRA. While the limited availability
of state RFRA case law certainly allows for the application of the federal RFRA in state
RFRA cases, many local RFRA claims and defenses are brought in federal court alongside
other claims that implicate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and issues involving constitutional violations.87 As a result, when individuals
bring a state RFRA claim or defense alongside other federal or constitutional issues,
IHGHUDOFRXUWVDUHDEOHWRZLHOGFRQVLGHUDEOHLQIOXHQFHRYHUDVWDWH5)5$¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
In addition, even when state RFRA claims are adjudicated in state court, judges sometimes

80. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 492.
81. Id. at 477.
82. Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143, 1155±56 (Ill. App. 2009) (deciding
that a special use permit code did not violate the Illinois RFRA statute based on the rational basis review-style
reasoning under the DSSHOODQW¶V First Amendment claim).
83. (PS¶W'LY'HS¶WRI Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997).
84. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 475±76.
85. Id. at 478.
86. Id. at 488±89.
87. See, e.g., Ross v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of N.M., 599 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2010); World Outreach
Conf. Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2009);
Olsen v. Idaho St. Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2004); Shrum v. City of Coweta, 558 F. Supp. 2d
1212, 1213 (E.D. Okla. 2008).
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rely on statutory interpretations of the federal RFRA by federal courts. 88 Illinois, Idaho,
and Indiana each provide good examples of how federal and state courts have applied
federal RFRA case law to state RFRA defenses and claims.
Federal courts in Illinois have determined how Illinois state courts ought to interpret
WKHVWDWH¶V5)5$LQDFLYLOFODLPEHFDXVH5)5$FODLPVLQ,OOLQRLVKDYHKLVWRULFDOO\EHHQ
brought in conjunction with federal RLUIPA claims or constitutional claims. 89 The local
Illinois RFRA or RLUIPA claims typically center on disputes regarding special land use
permits.90 In one case, a Muslim religious and educational institute, Irshad Learning
Center, sued multiple DuPage County boards after they refused to issue the center a
conditional land use permit.91 In another Illinois RFRA action, a Lutheran church filed a
FODLPDJDLQVWQXPHURXVGHIHQGDQWVLQFOXGLQJWKH&LW\RI$XURUD¶V0D\RUZKHQWKHFLW\
denied the church a permit to build an addition to its sanctuary. 92
Federal court decisions involving special land use permits and the Illinois RFRA
turned on whether the claimant demonstrated that the government imposed a substantial
burden on its free exercise of religion. In reviewing these cases, the Seventh Circuit
pointed out that the Illinois RFRA does not contain any definition or guidance for
interpreting what constitutes a substantial burden. 93 As a result, the circuit court held that
VWDWH FRXUWV VKRXOG LQWHUSUHW WKH VWDWH¶V 5)5$ DFFRUGLQJ WR IHGHUDO 5/8,3$ ODZ 94
Although Illinois appellate courts have not UXOHGRQKRZWKHVWDWH¶V5)5$RXJKWWREH
interpreted when used as a criminal defense,95 it follows that if a criminal defendant were
to assert the Illinois RFRA, Illinois state courts would likely look to interpretations of the
federal RFRA statute.96
In areas where criminal defendants have used state RFRAs as a defense, state courts
have relied on federal interpretations of RFRA in both the civil and criminal contexts. The
Court of Appeals of Idaho has heard two cases in which individuals asserted the Idaho
Free Exercise of Religion Protection Act (FERPA) as a criminal defense. 97 The first

88. See State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 733 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1219
(Idaho Ct. App. 2011); Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. 2002).
89. See, e.g., Irshad Learning Ctr. v. Cty. of Dupage, 937 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Oak Grove
Jubilee Ctr., Inc. v. City of Genoa, 808 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ill. 2004).
90. See, e.g., Irshad Learning Ctr., 937 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914; Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143, 1143 (Ill. App. 2009); Oak Grove Jubilee Ctr., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 968, 1020±21.
91. Irshad Learning Ctr., 937 F. Supp. 2d at 914.
92. Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church, 922 N.E.2d at 1145.
93. World Outreach Conf. Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Nelson v. Miller,
570 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2009); Maum Meditation House of Truth v. Lake Cty. Ill., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1088
(N.D. Ill. 2014).
94. Maum Meditation House of Truth, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1088. See, e.g., World Outreach Conference Ctr.,
591 F.3d at 539; Miller, 570 F.3d at 880.
95. See World Outreach Conference Ctr., 591 F.3d at 533; Miller, 570 F.3d at 880 (7th Cir. 2009); Fam. Life
Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Baer-Stefanov v. White, 773 F. Supp. 2d 755,
756 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
96. In some instances, federal courts have analyzed RFRA in the criminal context. See Oklevueha Native
Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718
(10th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001).
97. State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 732 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1219 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2011).
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instance, Idaho v. White, occurred in 2012. In White, the state charged a man with
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia.98 White moved to dismiss the charge, asserting
that the criminal drug possession and penalty laws substantially burdened his free exercise
under FERPA.99 On appeal, the state appellate court acknowledged that case law
LQWHUSUHWLQJ,GDKR¶V)(53$ ZDV ZDQWLQJEXWWKDW ZKHQ,GDKR¶VOHJLVODWXUHGUDIWHGWKe
state RFRA, it clearly intended to codify strict scrutiny as found in the federal RFRA. 100
As a result, Idaho state courts may rely on federal interpretations of RFRA civil claims
and apply those interpretations to RFRA criminal defense issues. 101
The only oWKHUSXEOLVKHGRSLQLRQLQYROYLQJ,GDKR¶V)(53$DVDFULPLQDOGHIHQVH
bears a striking resemblance to White. In 2013, the Court of Appeals of Idaho heard Idaho
v. Cordingley.102 Similar to White, Cordingley was arrested for possession of marijuana
and paraphernalia; he asserted the Idaho FERPA as a defense. 103 The court followed
White’s reasoning²relying, in part, on civil federal RFRA cases to interpret and apply the
Idaho FERPA.104 In addressing the source of authority Idaho courts should use when
interpreting aQG DSSO\LQJ )(53$ WKH FRXUW VWDWHG )(53$¶V OHJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\
GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKH³,GDKROHJLVODWXUHLQWHQGHGWRDGRSWWKHµFRPSHOOLQJVWDWHLQWHUHVW
WHVW¶FRQWDLQHGLQLWVIHGHUDOFRXQWHUSDUW´105
B. When a Caregiver Asserts a State RFRA as a Defense, She Can Rely on the Supreme
Court’s Hobby Lobby Ruling
1. 6RPH6WDWH&RXUWVDQG-XGJHV/RRNWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V5HFHQW)HGHUDO
RFRA Civil Ruling²Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
,QWKH,QGLDQD&RXUWRI$SSHDOVUHYLHZHGDPDQ¶V,QGLDQD5)5$GHIHQse to a
criminal charge for tax evasion in Tyms-Bey v. State.106 The court confirmed that the
Indiana RFRA applied to criminal proceedings and could be used as a criminal defense. 107
In its analysis, the court adopted the approach of three pre-Smith federal cases to determine
whether Indiana had a compelling interest in uniform and mandatory tax collection. 108 The
court also rejected Tyms-%H\¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHVWDWH¶VPHFKDQLVPIRUHQIRUFHPHQW²

98. White, 271 P.3d at 1219.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1220.
101. Id. at 1220±21. Specifically, the White FRXUWUHOLHGRQWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHFRPSHOOLQJ
state interest test in the civil case Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service. In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit held
thDW ZKHQ &RQJUHVV HQDFWHG 5)5$ LW ³FUHDWHG D FDXVH RI DFWLRQ IRU SHUVRQV ZKRVH H[HUFLVH RI UHOLJLRQ LV
substantially burdened by [state] action, regardless of whether the burden results from a neutral law of general
DSSOLFDELOLW\´)G WKCir. 2008).
102. See Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730.
103. Id. at 732.
104. Id. at 735±36 (relying on Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979)).
105. Id. at 733.
106. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 489.
107. Id. at 489±90.
108. Id. at 490±91 (citing U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258±61 (1982); +HUQDQGH] Y &RPP¶U RI ,QWHUQDO
Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989); Adams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 8

504

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:491

criminal charges for unpaid taxes²should be considered when analyzing the least
UHVWULFWLYH PHDQV RI SXUVXLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW 109 Instead, the court relied on federal
RFRA criminal decisions from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and held that the mandatory
payment of taxes ought to be considered as part of the least restrictive means analysis, as
opposed to the criminal enforcement of the tax system. 110 However, the dissenting judge
SRLQWHGWRWKHPDMRULW\¶V³VHOHFWLYHXVHRIIHGHUDODXWKRULW\´DQGLWVUHVXOWLQJHUURQHRXV
application of the Indiana RFRA.111
In contrast to the majority opinion, the Tyms-Bey dissent referenced the Indiana
RFRA statute, the Indiana Constitution, the history of First Amendment free-exercise
MXULVSUXGHQFH DQG VWULFW VFUXWLQ\¶V OHDVW UHVWULFWLYH PHDQV WHVW112 The dissenting judge
characterized the maMRULW\¶VUHOLDQFHRQSUH-Smith Supreme Court rulings as problematic
because, prior to Smith, the courts did not require states to demonstrate that their means of
VXEVWDQWLDOO\EXUGHQLQJDGHIHQGDQW¶VIUHHH[HUFLVHZDVWKHOHDVWUHVWULFWLYHPHDQVRIGRLQJ
so.113 In addition, prior to Smith, neutral laws of general applicability did not constitute a
VXEVWDQWLDO EXUGHQ RQ D SHUVRQ¶V IUHH H[HUFLVH 114 In contrast, the majority should have
applied the controlling analysis presented in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.² one
RIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VPRVWUHFHQWand infamous federal RFRA decisions.
7KHGLVVHQW¶VORJLFEHKLQGDSSO\LQJWKHHobby Lobby ruling was two-fold. First, the
language in the Indiana RFRA mirrored the language of the federal RFRA statute, which
the Supreme Court held in Hobby Lobby DVSURYLGLQJ³EURDGHUSURWHFWLRQWRWKHH[HUFLVH
RIUHOLJLRQ´WKDQSUH-Smith free exercise jurisprudence.115 Second, the Hobby Lobby ruling
³UHIOHFW>HG@WKHLQWHQW´RIWKH,QGLDQDOHJLVODWXUHDQGUHTXLUHGDIDFW-based approach to free
exercise defenses, as opposed to pre-Smith rulings.116 Moreover, the Hobby Lobby &RXUW¶V
decision stipulated that the pre-Smith free-exercise cases were ³LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHSODLQ
PHDQLQJ RI 5)5$´ EHFDXVH HTXLYDOHQF\ EHWZHHQ )LUVW $PHQGPHQW IUHH H[HUFLVH
violations and RFRA defenses is nonexistent.117 The dissenting judge concluded that
because the Tyms-Bey PDMRULW\ ³HUURQHRXVO\ SUHPLVHG´ LWV GHFLVLRQ RQ SUH-Smith free
H[HUFLVHUXOLQJVLW³XQGHUPLQH>G@WKHEURDGDQGSDUWLFXODUL]HGSURWHFWLRQ>WKH@OHJLVODWXUH
LQWHQGHG5)5$WRKDYH´118
In addition to the dissent in Tyms-Bey, other state courts have also incorporated the
Hobby Lobby ruling into state RFRA interpretations in civil cases.119 For example, in
Merrick v. Penzone WKH &RXUW RI $SSHDOV RI $UL]RQD UHYLHZHG DQ LQFDUFHUDWHG PDQ¶V
109. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d. at 491±92.
110. Id. at 491 (citing U.S. v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016); U.S. v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1288±
95 (10th Cir. 2011)).
111. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 492 (Najam, J. dissenting).
112. Id. at 492±93.
113. Id. at 493±94.
114. Id. at 492±93.
115. Id. 493±94.
116. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 493 (Najam, J. dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 499.
119. See Merrick v. Penzone, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0505, 2017 WL 2242841, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 23, 2017);
/HEDURQY2¶%ULHQ1R-00275, 2016 WL 5415484, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 2016).
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Arizona Free Exercise of Religion Act (FERA) claim against the Maricopa County sheriff
and others.120 The incarcerated man claimed a FERA violation after personnel at the jail
denied his request for unmonitored, unrecorded confessional telephone calls with his
sibling, alleged to be a church elder.121 The Arizona appellate court held that the trial court
iPSURSHUO\JUDQWHGVXPPDU\MXGJPHQWLQIDYRURIWKH0DULFRSD&RXQW\6KHULII¶V2IILFH
EHFDXVH QRWKLQJ LQ WKH UHFRUG LQGLFDWHG WKDW WKH 6KHULII¶V 2IILFH HPSOR\HG WKH OHDVW
UHVWULFWLYHPHDQVZKHQLWGHQLHGWKHFODLPDQW¶VUHTXHVWIRUan unmonitored confession.122
:KHQGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUWKH6KHULII¶V2IILFHPHWWKHOHDVWUHVWULFWLYHPHDQVVWDQGDUGWKH
Arizona appellate court referenced the federal RFRA and quoted the Hobby Lobby UXOLQJ¶V
SRLQWWKDW³µ>W@KHOHDVW-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding¶´123
2. The Federal RFRA Analysis in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is Advantageous to
Caregivers
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.124 The case
involved three closely-held, for-profit corporations that asserted a federal RFRA claim
against the federal government for requiring the coverage of certain contraceptive methods
XQGHU WKH $IIRUGDEOH &DUH $FW¶V FRQWUDFHSWLYH PDQGDWH 125 Specifically, the owners of
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel Corporation, and Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corporation alleged that the contraceptive mandate violated their free exercise rights under
the First Amendment and the federal RFRA because the mandate forced them to provide
health insurance coverage for contraceptive methods they believed to be abortifacients.
The owners of the corporations asserted that providing access to certain contraceptive
PHWKRGVYLRODWHGWKHLU³VLQFHUH&KULVWLDQEHOLHIVWKDWOLIHEHJLQV DWFRQFHSWLRQ´DQGWKXV
they could not facilitate access to the contested contraceptive methods without spiritual
impairment.126
-XVWLFH $OLWR ZURWH WKH RSLQLRQ RI WKH &RXUW UXOLQJ WKDW 5)5$¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI
³H[HUFLVH RI UHOLJLRQ´ HIIHFWXDWHG D ³FRPSOHWH Veparation from First Amendment case
ODZ´127 In addition, the Court held that the contraceptive mandate constituted a substantial
EXUGHQRQWKHFRUSRUDWHSHUVRQV¶IUHHH[HUFLVHRIUHOLJLRQ 128 and that the government failed
to meet its burden in showing that the mandate was the least restrictive means of furthering
its compelling interest to provide female workers with cost-free contraception.129
,QDGGUHVVLQJZKHWKHU&RQJUHVVLQWHQGHG5)5$¶V³H[HUFLVHRIUHOLJLRQ´FODXVHWR
merely echo First Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Alito contrasted First Amendment
120. Merrick, 2017 WL 2242841, at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id. at *3. Similarly, in Lebaron v. O’Brien, the Superior Court of Massachusetts also quoted Hobby
Lobby¶VUHIHUHQFHWRWKHOHDVWUHVWULFWLYHPHDQVVWDQGDUGQRWLQJWKDWWKHVWDQGDUGLV³µH[FHSWLRQDOO\GHPDQGLQJ¶´
2016 WL 541544, at *5.
124. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)
125. Id. at 682.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 696.
128. Id. at 718±27.
129. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 272±34.
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free exercise case law with the modern provisions of the federal RFRA. 130 He quoted Smith
and VWDWHGWKDW XQGHUWKH)LUVW $PHQGPHQW ³QHXWUDOJHQHUDOO\DSSOLFDEOHODZV PD\EH
applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental
LQWHUHVW´131 -XVWLFH $OLWR WKHQ KHOG WKDW DOWKRXJK 5)5$¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI ³H[HUFLVH RI
religiRQ´SUHYLRXVO\GLUHFWHGFRXUWVWRUHIHUHQFH)LUVW$PHQGPHQWFDVHODZ 132 Congress
DPHQGHGWKHGHILQLWLRQWRLQFOXGH³DQ\H[HUFLVHRIUHOLJLRQZKHWKHURUQRWFRPSHOOHGE\
RU FHQWUDO WR D V\VWHP RI UHOLJLRXV EHOLHI´ 133 Thus, the Court affirmed that the federal
5)5$³SURYLGH>V@YHU\EURDGSURWHFWLRQ>V@IRUUHOLJLRXVOLEHUW\´ 134
In addition, the Court concluded that the contraceptive mandate constituted a
VXEVWDQWLDO EXUGHQ RQ WKH FODLPDQW¶V IUHH H[HUFLVH EHFDXVH LW UHTXLUHG WKH FODLPDQWV WR
³HQJDJHLQFRQGXFWWKDWVHULRXVO\YLRODWHVWKHLUUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIV´ 135 In its reasoning, the
Court described how economic penalties on RFRA claimants may constitute a substantial
burden.136 If the three claimants refused to provide the mandated contraceptive coverage,
each faced additional taxes resulting between $15 million and $475 million per year. The
Court also carefully noted the role of courts in deciding what comprises a substantial
burden. For instance, Courts may not determine whether a substantial burden exists on the
EDVLVRIWKHUHDVRQDELOLW\RIWKHFODLPDQW¶VEHOLHI 137
Although the Hobby Lobby Court assumed the government had a compelling
interest, it also held that the government did not meet the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. In its decision, the Court noted that RFRA requires a narrow focus
when determining whether the state has demonstrated a compelling government interest²
WKHVWDWHFDQQRWDVVHUW³EURDGO\IRUPXODWHGLQWHUHVWV´ 138 VXFKDVWKHSURPRWLRQRI³SXEOLF
KHDOWK´ RU ³JHQGHU HTXDOLW\´ 139 Yet, the Court declined to adjudicate the compelling
LQWHUHVW LVVXH DVVXPLQJ ³WKDW WKH LQWHUHVW LQ JXDUDQWHHLQJ FRVW-free access to the . . .
FKDOOHQJHGFRQWUDFHSWLYH PHWKRGVLVFRPSHOOLQJ ZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRI5)5$´140
Instead, the Court reasoned that the government did not sufficiently demonstrate that its
contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive means of advancing the compelling interest
EHFDXVHWKHJRYHUQPHQWIDLOHGWRVKRZWKDW³LWODFNVRWKHUPHDQVRIDFKLHYLQJLWVGHVLUHG
goal without iPSRVLQJDVXEVWDQWLDOEXUGHQRQWKHH[HUFLVHRIUHOLJLRQ´ 141 Specifically,
the Court suggested that the government must GHPRQVWUDWHWKDW³DVVXP>LQJ@WKHFRVWRI
SURYLGLQJWKHIRXUFRQWUDFHSWLYHVDWLVVXH´ZDVQRWDYLDEOHDOWHUQDWLYH 142
Hobby Lobby is advantageous to self-induced abortion caregivers asserting a state
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 693±94.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 696; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A).
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 720±21.
Id. at 724.
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006).
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
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5)5$DVDGHIHQVHEHFDXVH$OLWR¶VRSLQLRQLVSHUKDSVWKHPRVWWKRURXJKO\GHWDLOHG5)5$
ruling. The majority opinion addresses several areas that previously generated differing
RFRA analyses in the courts.143 )RUH[DPSOH$OLWR¶VRSLQLRQWDUJHWVGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQ
First Amendment free exercise jurisprudence and RFRA, 144 the place of the Court in
DVVHVVLQJWKHVLQFHULW\RIDFODLPDQW¶VRUGHIHQGDQW¶VUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIV 145 the definition of
exercise of religion,146 what comprises a substantial burden,147 and what constitutes a least
restrictive means for the purposes of defeating a RFRA claim or defense. 148
Further, Hobby Lobby’s assumption that the state possesses a compelling interest is
particularly relevant. In a case where a caregiver is charged with the unauthorized practice
of medicine for assisting with self-induced abortion, the state is likely to assert a
compelling interest in public health, the life and health of the pregnant person, the
preservation of potential life, or the maintenance of professionalism and ethics within the
medical field. A cursory review of abortion cases bolsters this conclusion, 149 and supports
the view that courts would likely find a compelling state interest based on the state¶V
assertions. Such an assumption forces a judicial inquiry to focus on whether charging
FDUHJLYHUVLVWKHOHDVWUHVWULFWLYHPHDQVRIIXUWKHULQJWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVW Hobby Lobby’s
QDUURZ IRFXV EHQHILWV FDUHJLYHUV EHFDXVH WKH &RXUW¶V DQDO\VLV SX]]OHV RXW Srevious
ambiguities regarding what constitutes a least restrictive means and clearly states that the
government must show that other avenues of advancing its interest are not viable.
IV. RFRAS ARE VIABLE DEFENSES FOR CAREGIVERS
A. Caregivers for Self-Induced Abortion May be Arrested and Prosecuted
1. $ERUWLRQ¶V0HGLFDODQG/HJDO+LVWRU\3ODFHV$ERUWLRQ:LWKLQWKH5HDOPRI
Medical Practice
Although abortion is legal and women have the constitutional right to choose an
abortion, case law and statutes indicate that abortion is typically considered a medical
procedure left to licensed physicians working in abortion clinics. Nevertheless, history
shows that abortions have not been exclusively performed by physicians. 150 Therefore, it
is important to briefly address how abortion is unique in its medical history and in judicial
review because these two factors have contributed to an environment in which law
enforcement and prosecutors are able to utilize unauthorized medical practice laws to
arrest and charge caregivers.
Self-induced abortion and caregiving for self-induced abortion are not new
phenomena. In the U.S., self-induced abortion and caregiving existed prior to colonization,

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 492.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682, 692±94.
Id. at 717±22.
Id. at 694±97.
Id. at 688±92.
Id. at 728±30.
See discussion infra 3DUW,9%DQGQRWHV
LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 71 (1997).
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ZKHUH SUHJQDQF\ WHUPLQDWLRQ ZDV ³SUDFWLFH>G@ LQ UHVSRQVH´ WR WKH UHDOLWLHV Indigenous
women faced.151 There is also evidence of self-induced abortion within colonial
FRPPXQLWLHVZKHQ³KRPHPHGLFDOJXLGHVJDYHUHFLSHVIRUµEULQJLQJRQWKHPHQVHV¶ZLWK
KHUEVWKDWFRXOGEHJURZQLQRQH¶VJDUGHQRUHDVLO\IRXQGLQWKHZRRGV´ 152 In addition,
prior to the criminalization of abortion, drugs to self-induce abortion were easily
attainable, and pregnancy termination was not associated with religious or moral
failings.153 %HFDXVHREVWHWULFVKDGDOZD\VEHHQWKH³SURYLQFHRIIHPDOHPLGZLYHV´ 154 and
PLGZLYHV HYLQFHG DQ ³LQWLPDWH NQRZOHGJH RI ZRPHQ¶V ERGLHV DQG UHSURGXFWLRQ´ WKH\
typically performed abortions before obstetrics and gynecology became a western medical
practice.155 Even after its criminalization in the late-nineteenth century, midwives
continued to perform abortions in relatively equal numbers with doctors. 156 Taken
together, all of these factors indicate that women have sought assistance with abortion
outside of the formal healthcare industry for over a century.157
Although the American Medical Association (AMA) once led the campaign to
criminalize abortion, the organization currently supports safe access to abortion. 158 During
the Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt hearings, the AMA joined the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists¶ DPLFXV EULHI IRU :KROH :RPDQ¶V +HDOWK 159
5HJDUGLQJ DERUWLRQ DQ $0$ VSRNHVSHUVRQ VWDWHG WKDW LW ³VHHNV WR OLPLW JRYHUQPHQW
interference in the practice of medicine and oppose government regulation of medicine
WKDWLVXQVXSSRUWHGE\VFLHQWLILFHYLGHQFH´ 160
:KLOHWKHPHGLFDOFRPPXQLW\¶VVXSSRUWIRUVDIHDERUWLRQDFFHVVOHJLWLPL]HVDERUWLRQ
as a genuine public health issue, abortion still remains segregated from most medical
practices. Although almost one-third of abortions at eight weeks of gestation or less are
medically induced and require no surgical procedure,161 recent studies indicate that nearly
151. Christina Rose, Native History: Roe v. Wade Passes, But Indigenous Women Lack Access, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (Jan. 22, 2014), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/native-history-roe-v-wadepasses-but-indigenous-women-lack-access-aPTclebqBkqJx-9OOHKwfQ/.
152. Katha
Pollitt,
Abortion
in
American
History,
ATLANTIC
(May
1997),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/05/abortion-in-american-history/376851.
153. Jessica Ravitz, The Surprising History of Abortion in the United States, CNN (June 27, 2016, 10:52 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/health/abortion-history-in-united-states/index.html.
154. Obstetrics and gynecology, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/obstetrics.
155. Dutton-Kenny, supra note 7, at 21.
156. REAGAN, supra QRWHDW
157. Id. at 74.
158. As gynecology became a professional practice, physicians from the American Medical Association
$0$ YLHGIRUWKHFULPLQDOL]DWLRQRIDERUWLRQDVDPHDQVWRJDLQSURIHVVLRQDO³VXSUHPDF\´ RYHU³PLGZLYHVDQG
KRPHRSDWKV´ Katha
Pollitt,
Abortion
in
American
History,
ATLANTIC
(May
1997),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/05/abortion-in-american-history/376851. See also DuttonKenny, supra note 7, at 22.
159. Ravitz, supra note 153.
160. Id.
161. Typically, a medication abortion is non-invasive and requires no surgical procedure. The most common
type of medication abortion involves the use of two medications, mifepristone and misoprostol. According to the
+HQU\ - .DLVHU )DPLO\ )RXQGDWLRQ ³>P@LIHSULVWRQH EORFNV SURJHVWHURQH´ ZKLFK HQGV WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI D
pregnancy. Medication Abortion, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/medication-abortion. After taking mifepristone, the
patient takes misoprostol, which induces an early miscarriage and empties the uterus. In some states, the abortion
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sixty percent of abortions are performed in specialized abortion clinics, as opposed to
KRVSLWDOV RU SK\VLFLDQ¶V RIILFHV162 Further, a limited number of physicians possess
experience with the practice because abortion is rarely taught in medical schools. 163
'HVSLWHDERUWLRQ¶VLVRODWLRQZLWKLQWKHPHGLFDOILHOGQHDUO\RQHLQIRXUZRPHQZLOOVWLOO
choose to terminate a pregnancy by age forty-five.164 Accordingly, abortioQ¶VFRQILQHPHQW
to specialized clinics only exacerbates the legal liabilities caregivers face because women
will continue to need access to abortion but may not access it through a clinic.
Abortion case law also supports the assertion that abortion is squarely placed within
the realm of professional medical care, leading to legal uncertainties for caregivers. For
LQVWDQFH DERUWLRQ ULJKWV FDVH ODZ KDV HPSKDVL]HG SK\VLFLDQV¶ UROHV DV DERUWLRQ
providers.165 In Roe v. Wade, arguments presented by the medical field seemed to shape
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJZKHQLWGHFLGHGWKDWZRPHQKDYHDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWWR
choose abortion.166 Despite the presence of feminist and right-to-life voices in amicus
briefs filed to the Roe &RXUW WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ ³DSSHDUHd mainly responsive to the
DUJXPHQWVRIWKHPHGLFDOFRPPXQLW\´167 Indeed, the reasoning in Roe is based on medical
VFLHQFH DQG ³LWV PDLQ KROGLQJ DIILUPHG WKH DXWRQRP\ RI GRFWRUV WR DFW LQ ZKDW WKH\
EHOLHYHGWREH WKH EHVWLQWHUHVWRIWKHLUSDWLHQWV´ 168 Prior to the Roe decision, the legal
FRPPXQLW\ DOVR YLHZHG DERUWLRQ DV D SK\VLFLDQ¶V ULJKWV LVVXH 7KH $PHULFDQ /HJDO
,QVWLWXWH SURSRVHG PRGHO OHJLVODWLRQ UHTXLULQJ ³FRPPLWWHHV RI GRFWRUV WR HYDOXDWH D
ZRPDQ¶VUHDVRQVIRUVHHNLQJDQDERUWLRQDQGWRJUDQWSHUPLVVLRQLIWKHZRPDQ¶VVLWXDWLRQ
PHWVSHFLILHGFULWHULD´169 Further, although the language of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
does not explicitly silo the practice of abortion to the medical industry, it provided that
states may regulate abortion clinics and may prohibit clinics from performing abortions at

can be completed at home. Id. Later, the patient returns to the clinic or physician for a follow-up appointment to
confirm termination of the pregnancy. :KHQWDNHQSULRUWRHLJKWZHHNV¶JHVWDWLRQPHGLFDWLRQDERUWLRQLVVDIH
and almost always completely effective. Id. In addition, the risk of major complication is less than five percent
DQGWKH³DVVRFLDWHGPRUWDOLW\UDWH´LV³OHVVWKDQRQHSHUFHQW  ´Id.
162. Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2014,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/psrh/2017/01/abortion-incidenceand-service-availability-united-states-2014.
163. See Carrie Feibel, Can Doctors Learn to Perform Abortions Without Doing One?, NPR (June 21, 2016
3:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/06/21/481774579/can-doctors-learn-to-performabortions-without-doing-one (quoting a senior doctor and medical professor that while the procedure for an
elective abortion is the same as that for a miscarriage, LWVSHUIRUPDQFHUHTXLUHV³DGGLWLRQDOWUDLQLQJ´DQGWKDW2%*<1VZKRZDQWWRSHUIRUPDERUWLRQVPXVWDOVR³OHDUQKRZWRDGPLQLVWHUPHGLFDODERUWLRQV´ 0DUD*RUGRQ
The Scarcity of Abortion Training in American’s Medical Schools, ATLANTIC (June 9, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/learning-abortion-in-medical-school/395075.
164. Abortion Is a Common Experience for U.S. Women Despite Dramatic Declines in Rates, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2017/abortion-common-experience-us-womendespite-dramatic-declines-rates.
165. See :KROH :RPDQ¶V +HDOWK Y +HOOHUVWHGW  6 &W     3ODQQHG 3DUHQWKRRG RI
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U6  
166. LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION
DEBATE
BEFORE
THE
SUPREME
COURT¶S
RULING,
at
vii
(2012),
http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/beforeroe2nded_1.pdf.
167. Id. at viii.
168. Id. at viii, ix.
169. Id. at 4.
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viability.170 Thus, the Casey GHFLVLRQLQGLFDWHVWKH&RXUW¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWDERUWLRQZRXOG
remain within the realm of medical practice.
$ERUWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\LQWKHPHGLFDOFRPPXQLW\DQGFDVHODZFRQILQLQJDERUWLRQto the
PHGLFDO LQGXVWU\ FRPELQH ZLWK ³DERUWLRQ H[FHSWLRQDOLVP´ WR FUHDWH DQ HQYLURQPHQW LQ
which caregivers may be charged with crimes such as the unauthorized practice of
medicine. Among legal scholars,171 WKH WHUP ³DERUWLRQ H[FHSWLRQDOLVP´ UHIHUV WR ³WKH
tendency of legislatures and courts to subject abortion to unique, and uniquely burdensome
UXOHV´172 6XFK H[FHSWLRQDOLVP DOVR UHFRJQL]HV WKDW DERUWLRQ LV VLQJOHG RXW ³IRU PRUH
UHVWULFWLYHJRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQDVFRPSDUHGWRRWKHUVLPLODUSURFHGXUHV´ 173
Abortion laws in the U.S. demonstrate that most legislatures limit lawful abortion
practice to the medical field. Currently, nineteen states forbid the practice of abortion
outside of hospital setting after specified points in the pregnancy. 174 For instance, fortytwo states require an abortion to be performed by a licensed physician.175 Specifically, the
,GDKR&RGHPDNHVLWDIHORQ\WR³SURYLGH>@VXSSO>\@RUDGPLQLVWHU>@´PHGLFDWLRQGUXJV
or any substance to a person with the intent of terminating her pregnancy, unless that
LQGLYLGXDOLV³OLFHQVHGRUFHUWLILHGWRSURYLGHKHDOWKFDUHLQ,GDKR´176 The Idaho Code also
VWDWHVWKDW³>L@WLVXQODZIXOIRUDQ\SHUVRQRWKHUWKDQDSK\VLFLDQWRFDXVHRUSHUIRUPDQ
DERUWLRQ´177 7KH,QGLDQD&RGHH[SUHVVO\VWDWHVWKDW³>D@ERUWion in all instances shall be a
FULPLQDO DFW´ H[FHSW ZKHQ D SK\VLFLDQ SHUIRUPV WKH DERUWLRQ XQGHU D QDUURZ VHW RI
circumstances.178 The Illinois abortion statute also forbids non-physicians from
performing abortions.179 Further, nineteen states require that clinicians providing
medication abortions be physically present during the administration of abortion
medication, thereby prohibiting the use of telemedicine and limiting access to abortion in
rural areas.180 As a result, law enforcement and prosecutors are easily able to use medical
care laws to incriminate caregivers.
2. Law Enforcement and Prosecutors May Arrest and Charge Caregivers by Using
Laws Intended to Protect the Public Health
How unauthorized practice of medicine laws define medical practice and pregnancy
provides law enforcement and prosecutors with opportunities to arrest and charge
170. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 874.
171. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1047, 1048 (2014), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss2/13 (citing Ian Vandewalker,
Abortion and Informed Consent, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012); Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion
Distortion, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2014)).
172. Id. at 1048.
173. Id. (quoting Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012)).
174. An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/overview-abortion-laws.
175. Id.
176. IDAHO CODE § 18-605(1).
177. Id. at § 18-608(A).
178. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1; accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.750; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(b)(1).
179. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/3.1.
180. Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/medication-abortion.
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caregivers. Indiana law broadly defines the practice of medicine to include holding oneself
RXW WR WKH SXEOLF WR HLWKHU VXJJHVW RU DGPLQLVWHU ³DQ\ IRUP RI WUHDWPHQW´ 181 Further,
,QGLDQD¶VODZSURYLGHVWKDW ³LWLVXQODZIXOIRUDQ\SHUVRQWRSUDFWLFHPHGLFLQH . . without
KROGLQJDOLFHQVHRUSHUPLWWRGRVR´182 Going further than the statute provides, Indiana
courts have declared that midwifery² ³FDUHIRUFKLOGEHDULQJZRPen . . . throughout preSUHJQDQF\SUHJQDQF\ELUWKSRVWSDUWXPDQGWKHHDUO\ZHHNVRIOLIH´²183 is not a medical
practice and that pregnancy should be treated by physicians. 184 Similarly, Illinois courts
have held that pregnancy is considered a condition undeUWKHVWDWH¶V0HGLFDO3UDFWLFH$FW
of 1987,185 ZKLFK UHTXLUHV DQ\ LQGLYLGXDO ZKR ³WUHDWV DQ\ DLOPHQW RU FRQGLWLRQ  . . of
DQRWKHU´ WR SRVVHVV D YDOLG PHGLFDO OLFHQVH186 $Q\ SHUVRQ IRXQG WR YLRODWH ,OOLQRLV¶V
Medical Practice Act is guilty of a felony, which is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000
or imprisonment from one to three years. 187
Currently, the number of caregivers arrested and charged with the unauthorized
practice of medicine is unknown. However, prosecutors have brought a variety of charges
against women who choose to self-induce abortion.188 Women who have self-induced have
faced charges including the unlawful practice of medicine, 189 solicitation of murder,190
feticide,191 attempted homicide,192 and abuse of a corpse and concealing a birth.193 These
prosecutions often occur in the absence of any statute that expressly prohibits self-induced
abortion,194 DQGWKXVLQGLFDWHDVWDWH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSHQDOL]HZRPHQIRURYHUVHHLQJRU
administering their own reproductive healthcare.
Considering that women who self-induce abortion are prosecuted under medical
practice laws and abortion statutes, it is not wholly inconceivable that law enforcement

181. IND. CODE § 25-22.5-8-1.
182. Id.
183. Mary J. Renfrew et al., Midwifery: An Executive Summary for The Lancet’s Series 3, LANCET (June
2014), http://www.thelancet.com/pb/assets/raw/Lancet/stories/series/midwifery/midwifery_exec_summ.pdf.
184. See Smith v. State ex rel. Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind., 459 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
185. Illinois v. Bickham, 621 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
186. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/49.
187. Id. at 60/59.
188. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2012); Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra
QRWHDW
189. Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 17.
190. In re J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 411 (Utah 2011); see also Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 14.
191. Patel v. Indiana, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
192. Christine Hauser, Tennessee Woman Accused of Coat-Hanger Abortion Attempt Faces New Charges,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/us/tennessee-woman-accused-of-coathanger-abortion-faces-new-charges.html; see also Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 16.
193. Anne Bynum, who was charged with abuse of a corpse and sentenced for concealing a birth, did not
intend to terminate her own pregnancy. Patty Wooten, Judge acquits woman of abuse of a corpse, jury convicts
her of concealing birth, SEAARK TODAY (Mar. 6, 2016), http://searktoday.com/judge-acquits-woman-of-abuseof-corpse-jury-convicts-her-of-concealing-birth. Instead, she took abortion medication to induce early labor in
an effort to give birth without the knowledge of her family and place the baby for adoption. Id. However,
%\QXP¶V VWRU\ VXSSRUWV WKH FRQFHSW WKDW VRPH SURVHFXWRUV DUH ZLOOLQJ WR FKDUJH ZRPHQ ZKR VHOI-induce
regardless of whether they intend to terminate a pregnancy or give birth. See also Letter to U.N. Working Group,
supra note 1, at 18.
194. Only a limited number of states expressly outlaw self-induced abortion. See Letter to U.N. Working
Group, supra note 1 and accompanying text.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018

21

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 8

512

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:491

and prosecutors would pursue charges against a caregiver. Indeed, attorneys are currently
assessing the legal risks to caregivers and mapping out criminal charges that caregivers
may confront.195 For instance, full-spectrum doulas²³trained professional[s] who provide
. . SK\VLFDOHPRWLRQDODQGLQIRUPDWLRQDOVXSSRUW´WRDSUHJQDQWSHUVRQ²196and abortion
hotline workers risk being charged with the unauthorized practice of medicine because
they often operate outside of the formal healthcare system. 197 In states without midwifery
OLFHQVLQJ ODZV ³PLGZLYHV PD\ EH DUUHVWHG DQG SURVHFXWHG RQ FKDUJHV RI SUDFWLFLQJ
medicine . . ZLWKRXWDOLFHQVH´198 However, caregivers are not necessarily limited to those
with an interest or vocation in abortion practice. For the purposes of the present issue,
caregivers are more broadly defined to include friends, family, or religious and spiritual
leaders who may assist a pregnant person in self-induced abortion.
-HQQLIHU:KDOHQ¶VVWRU\SURYLGHVHYLGHQFHWKDWSURVHFXWRUVDUHFKDUJLQJFDUHJLYHUV
In 2014, Whalen, a mother of three living in Pennsylvania, was convicted of a felony after
providing her teenage daughter with abortion medication in 2012.199 :KDOHQ¶VGDXJKWHU
a sixteen-year-old with an unplanned pregnancy, intended to undergo an abortion at a
traditional clinic. However, access to the nearest clinic required her to wait twenty-four
hours after her initial counseling session and would have resulted in a 300-mile trip within
a two-day period.200 ,QDGGLWLRQWKHFOLQLF¶VSURFHGXUHUHTXLUHGDQRXW-of-pocket cost of
at least $300. Facing geographic and monetary limitations, Whalen agreed to purchase
abortion pills for her daughter.201 6KRUWO\ DIWHU WDNLQJ WKH SLOOV :KDOHQ¶V GDXJKWHU
experienced stomach pains. Although this is a common side effect of abortion medication
and typically indicates that the miscarriage is complete, 202 :KDOHQ¶VGDXJKter asked to go
to the hospital.203 The hospital sent Whalen and her daughter home without any
intervention or complications. Although the hospital did not mention any legal risks to
Whalen, it reported her to state child-protective services. Later, police sHDUFKHG:KDOHQ¶V
house and identified the box that contained the abortion pills. 204 Two years after her
GDXJKWHU¶V DERUWLRQ WKH 'LVWULFW $WWRUQH\ FKDUJHG :KDOHQ ZLWK D IHORQ\ IRU RIIHULQJ
195. SIA LEGAL TEAM, Making Abortion a Crime (Again): How Extreme Prosecutors Attempt to Punish
People for Abortions in the U.S., https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/aa251a_09c00144ac5b4bb997637bc3ac2c7259
.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
196. DONA INT¶L, What is a doula?, https://www.dona.org/what-is-a-doula/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
197. SIA LEGAL TEAM, supra note 195.
198. Catherine Elton, American Women: Birthing Babies at Home, TIME (Sept. 4, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2011940,00.html. See also Smith v. State ex rel. Med.
Licensing Bd. of Ind., 459 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
199. Emily Bazelon, A Mother in Jail for Helping Her Daughter Have an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/magazine/a-mother-in-jail-for-helping-her-daughter-have-an-abor
tion.html; Quinn Cummings, Making Abortions Illegal Doesn’t Make Them Go Away, TIME (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://time.com/3423785/illegal-abortions/; David DeKok, Pennsylvania mother who gave daughter abortion pill
gets prison, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2014, 11:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-pennsylvaniaabortion/pennsylvania-mother-who-gave-daughter-abortion-pill-gets-prison-idUSKBN0H10IR20140906.
200. See Bazelon, supra note 199.
201. Id.
202. FDA,
Mifeprex
(mifepristone)
tablets
label
7,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/020687s020lbl.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
203. See Bazelon, supra note 199.
204. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/8

22

Rush: Religious Freedom and Self-Induced Abortion

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

2019]

513

medical consultation without a medical license. The District Attorney also charged
Whalen with other crimes including dispensing drugs without a pharmacy license. In a
VWDWHPHQWWKH'LVWULFW$WWRUQH\FODLPHG³WKLVFDVHLVDERXWHQGDQJHULQJWKHZHOIDUHRID
FKLOGWKURXJKWKHXQDXWKRUL]HGSUDFWLFHRIPHGLFLQHDQGSKDUPDF\´ 205 Although the judge
could have given Whalen probation, he sentenced her to up to eighteen months in jail. 206
2QH\HDUDIWHU:KDOHQ¶VFRQYLFWLRQSURVHFXWRUVGURSSHGPXUGHUFKDUJHVDJDLQVWD
Georgia woman who was arrested and jailed for taking abortion pills without a prescription
or administration from a physician. 207 After attempting to self-induce abortion with
medication, Kenlissia Jones prematurely gave birth on her way to the hospital. Shortly
WKHUHDIWHUVKHZDV³MDLOHGDQGFKDUJHGZLWKPXUGHU´IRUWKHGeath of the fetus.208 Although
WKH'LVWULFW$WWRUQH\GURSSHGWKHFKDUJHVDIWHUPRUH³WKRURXJKOHJDOUHVHDUFK´UHYHDOHG
WKDWWKHVWDWHGLGQRW³SUHVHQWO\ . SHUPLWSURVHFXWLRQRI0V-RQHV´KHDOVRVWDWHGWKDW
³WKLUG SDUWLHV FRXOG EH FULPLQDOO\ SURVHFXWHG for their actions relating to an illegal
DERUWLRQ´209 %RWK:KDOHQ¶VLQFDUFHUDWLRQDQG-RQHV¶VDUUHVWDQGSURVHFXWLRQLQGLFDWHWKDW
prosecutors will charge caregivers and may use unauthorized practice of medicine laws to
do so.
B. Applying Hobby Lobby Allows a Caregiver to Successfully Assert a State RFRA as a
Defense to Criminal Charges
1. Under Hobby Lobby, Caregiving Meets the Definition of a Sincerely Held
Religious Belief.
Although statutes that expressly criminalize self-induced abortion are
unconstitutional and prosecutions against women who self-induce are tenuous,210
caregivers may not have similar constitutional protections because they are not unduly
burdened in accessing abortion for themselves. 211 Accordingly, caregivers who assist
women in self-inducing abortion require adequate legal safeguards. While there are likely
a number of litigation strategies that could assist caregivers in their criminal defense, state
RFRAs may be the most beneficial to caregivers who assist with self-induced abortion
from a religious or spiritual perspective.
To successfully assert a state RFRA as a defense, the caregiver must first show that
she assisted in the provision of a self-induced abortion because of a sincerely held religious

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Abby Phillip, Murder charges dropped against a Georgia woman jailed for taking abortion pills, WASH.
POST (June 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/06/10/woman-chargedwith-murder-didnt-have-any-money-to-get-an-abortion-the-legal-way-brother-says/?utm_term=.370af9acba75.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 9.
211. In Planned ParenthoodWKH&RXUWKHOGWKDW³>R@QO\ZKHUHVWDWHUHJXODWLRQLPSRVHVan undue burden on a
SHUVRQ¶VDELOLW\WRPDNH>WKHDERUWLRQ@GHFLVLRQ´LVWKHVWDWH¶VDFWLRQXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO86DW ,QLWV
ruling, the Court did not discuss the possibility of an undue burden for a third party, or even for a physician, to
perform or assist with an abortion. As a result, this paper does not assume that the undue burden standard applies
to caregivers who assist a person with self-induced abortion.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018

23

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 8

TULSA LAW REVIEW

514

[Vol. 54:491

belief. The caregiver can satisfy the first element of RFRA for three reasons. First, under
Hobby LobbyWKHFDUHJLYHU¶VDFWLRQVGRQRWKDYHWREHPDQGDWHGE\RUIXQGDPHQWDOWRKHU
religious beliefs.212 ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH FDUHJLYHU¶V UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV GR QRW KDYH WR PHHW D
reasonableness standard.213 Finally, courts have experience ascertaining whether a
SHUVRQ¶VUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVDUHLQVLQFHUH214 and therefore could easily determine whether a
caregiver was asserting RFRA as a means to simply shirk responsibility from criminal or
civil penalties.
The idea that a caregiver may assist in self-induced abortion because of her religious
beliefs may seem novel, but the Hobby Lobby &RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIreligious exercise
under RFRA allows for this possibility. In Hobby Lobby, the Court noted that, prior to the
SDVVDJHRIWKH5/8,3$5)5$¶VGHILQLWLRQRIUHOLJLRXVH[HUFLVHZDVOLPLWHGWRWKDWXQGHU
First Amendment case law.215 +RZHYHU VLQFH 5/8,3$¶V SDVVDJH WKH IHGHUDO 5)5$¶V
definition of exercise of religion expanded because Congress incorporated RLU,3$¶V
definition of the phrase into the RFRA statute.216 Today, religious exercise under RFRA
³LQFOXGHVDQ\H[HUFLVHRIUHOLJLRQZKHWKHURUQRWFRPSHOOHGE\RUFHQWUDOWRDV\VWHPRI
UHOLJLRXVEHOLHI´ 217 The Hobby Lobby Court also held that the exercise of religion is not
OLPLWHG WR DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V EHOLHI 218 ,QVWHDG H[HUFLVH RI UHOLJLRQ DOVR LQFOXGHV RQH¶V
SURIHVVLRQ DV ZHOO RQH¶V SHUIRUPDQFH RI RU DEVWHQWLRQ IURP SK\VLFDO DFWV 219 Thus, the
FDUHJLYHU¶VDVVLVWDQFHGRHVQRWKDYHWREHPDQGDWHGE\DQ\UHOLJLRus dogma or text. So
long as a religious or spiritual belief motivates her actions or she is assisting with selfinduced abortion as a religious or spiritual leader, her assistance constitutes an exercise of
religion.
,Q DGGLWLRQ FRXUWV¶ UHOXFWDQFH WR DSSO\ D UHDVRQDEOHQHVV VWDQGDUG WR D SHUVRQ¶V
sincerity of religious belief supports RFRA protections for caregivers. In Hobby Lobby,
WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV JRYHUQPHQW GLG QRW RSHQO\ GLVSXWH WKH VLQFHULW\ RI DQ\ LQGLYLGXDOV¶
religious beliefs.220 However, the government did imply that the reasonableness of the
FRUSRUDWLRQV¶ UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV ZDV TXHVWLRQDEOH ZKHQ LW DVVHUWHG WKDW WKH OLQN EHWZHHQ
SURYLGLQJ FRQWUDFHSWLRQ DQG WKH ³GHVWUXFWLRQ RI DQ HPEU\R´ ZDV WRR ZHDN IRU WKH
goveUQPHQW¶VDFWLRQVWREHDVXEVWDQWLDOEXUGHQ,QUHVSRQVHWKH&RXUWH[SOLFLWO\GLVFXVVHG
KRZGHWHUPLQLQJWKHVLQFHULW\RIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVGLIIHUVIURPVXEMHFWLQJ
DSHUVRQ¶VUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVWRDUHDVRQDEOHQHVVVWDQGDUG 221
In contrast to dHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU D FODLPDQW¶V RU GHIHQGDQW¶V UHOLJLRXV EHOLHI LV
sincere, the Hobby Lobby &RXUWUHDIILUPHGWKHJHQHUDOUXOHWKDWFRXUWVKDYH³QREXVLQHVV

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 682 (2014)
Id. at 724±25.
Id. at 717±18.
Id. at 713±15.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 713±15.
Id.
Id. at 717±18.
Id. at 724±25 FLWLQJ7KRPDVY5HY%GRI,QG(PS¶W6HF'LY86  

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/8

24

Rush: Religious Freedom and Self-Induced Abortion

2019]

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

515

DGGUHVVLQJ´ WKH UDWLRQDOLW\ RI D SHUVRQ¶V UHOLJLRXV EHOLHI 222 Indeed, this is a sentiment
expressed iQ 6XSUHPH &RXUW UXOLQJV SULRU WR WKH IHGHUDO 5)5$¶V HQDFWPHQW 223 For
instance, although the Court in Smith did not side with participants of the Native American
&KXUFK-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VRSLQLRQDOVRKHOGWKDWFRXUWVVKRXOGQRWGHWHUPLQHWKHSODXVLELOLW\
of a religious claim.224 Hobby Lobby¶VDIILUPDWLRQGLVFRXUDJLQJFRXUWVIURPDVVHVVLQJWKH
UHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIDSHUVRQ¶VUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVLVVLJQLILFDQWIRUDFDUHJLYHU)RULQVWDQFH
placing abortion in a religious context may seem unreasonable to those whose religious
beliefs warn against access to non-therapeutic abortion. Even among pro-choice
VXSSRUWHUVDFDUHJLYHUV¶DVVHUWLRQRIUHOLJLRXVIUHHH[HUFLVHPD\QRWEHZHOO-understood.
7KXV D FRXUW¶V UHIUDLQ IURP DVVHVVLQJ WKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI WKH FDUHJLYHU¶V religious
EHOLHIVRQDERUWLRQKHOSVOLPLWWKHLQIOXHQFHRIELDVZKHQGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUWKHFDUHJLYHU¶V
beliefs are sincere.
In a case where a caregiver is charged with a crime, it is her burden to establish that
her religious or spiritual belief to assist with self-induced abortion is sincere. Regarding
WKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHFDUHJLYHU¶VEHOLHIVDUHVLQFHUHWKH&RXUWLQHobby Lobby
held that prior case law substantially catalogs the ability of courts to determine when a
SHUVRQ¶VRUFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VDsserted religious beliefs act as a façade for simply choosing not
to conform to civil or criminal law. For example, a pretextual assertion of religious
freedom may include an exemption that provides the claimant with significant financial
benefits.225 FeigniQJUHOLJLRXVEHOLHI PD\DOVRLQFOXGHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHTXHVW IRUUDFLDO
segregation during his incarceration.226 However, the caregiver should not rely on
assumptions that the court will not question her sincerity. Instead, she can assert that her
religious belief is sincere, and she can support her assertion with an explanation of
DERUWLRQ¶VSODFHLQUHOLJLRXVDQGVSLULWXDOSUDFWLFHWKURXJKRXW86KLVWRU\DQGDQDORJL]H
her position to others who are similarly situated.
Evidence that religious beliefs may motivate a caregiver to assist with self-induced
abortion is not wanting. Prior to the legalization of abortion under Roe v. Wade, religious
and spiritual leaders helped women access safe, anonymous abortions. 227 Many religious
leaders formed a network known as the Clergy Consultation Service and operated across
the U.S. to ensure that women were able to safely access the procedure. 228 In New York,
WKH &OHUJ\ &RQVXOWDWLRQ 6HUYLFH RQ $ERUWLRQ FRQVLVWHG RI ³PRUH WKDQ  PRVWO\

222. Id.
223. See (PS¶W'LY'HS¶WRI+XPDQ5HVRI2UY6PLWK86  +HUQDQGH]Y&RPP¶U
86  3UHVE\WHULDQ&KXUFKLQ86Y0DU\(OL]DEHWK%OXH+XOO0HP¶O3UHVE\WHULDQ&KXUFK
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
224. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
225. 86Y4XDLQWDQFH)G WK&LU 
226. Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1996).
227. Sarah McCammon, 50 Years Ago, A Network of Clergy Helped Women Seeking Abortion, NPR: ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (May 19, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/19/529175737/50-years-ago-anetwork-of-clergy-helped-women-seeking-abortion.
228. Id; see also Grace Wong, Before Roe v. Wade, Chicago Clergy Helped Women end Unwanted
Pregnancies, CHI. TRIB. (May 19, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-abortion-clergy-group-met20170519-story.html.
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Protestant pastors as well as some SULHVWVDQGUDEELV´229 The Clergy Consultation Service
formed in 1967 and, in addition to ensuring safe access to abortion, members counseled
women in their decisions to terminate their pregnancies. 230
Even after its legalization, clergy and other religious leaders continued to actively
support access to abortion through organizations like the national Religious Coalition for
Reproductive Choice (RCRC), which formed out of the Clergy Consultation Service. 231
Today, RCRC provides educational and pastoral training LQDQHIIRUWWR³XQLWHSDVWRUVDQG
theologians to break the stigma of abortion . . LQUHOLJLRXVFRPPXQLWLHV´232 Specifically,
RCRC offers pastoral care training so that clergy and other religious leaders may
³FRPSDVVLRQDWHO\OLVWHQWRDQGVXSSRUWZRPHQDQGJLUOV´EHFDXVH³>S@URWHFWLQJZRPHQ¶V
UHSURGXFWLYH FKRLFHV UHTXLUHV QRW MXVW YLEUDQW VHFXODU PRYHPHQWV´ 233 In the training,
5&5&FDOOVXSRQUHOLJLRXVDQGVSLULWXDOOHDGHUVWREULQJ³PRUDOFRQYLFWLRQDQGWKHRORJ\´
WRLVVXHVUHJDUGLQJZRPHQ¶VDFFHVVWRDERUWLRQ7KHWUDLQLQJSURYLGHV³VSLULWXDODQGPRUDO
perspectives on reproductive decision-PDNLQJ´ EHFDXVH VXFK decisions are often only
GLVFXVVHGIURP³PHGLFDOVFLHQWLILF>@DQGSROLWLFDOYLHZSRLQWV´ 234 Other religious groups
and congregations supporting access to abortion include Catholics for Choice, 235 Judson
Memorial Church,236 National Council of Jewish Women,237 Methodist Federation for
Social Action,238 Presbyterian Feminist Agenda Network,239 United Church of Christ,240
and Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations. 241
)LOLQJVIRUVRPHRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWDERUWLRQFDVHVUHYHDOWKDW
religious leaders, congregations, and faith-based organizations have expressed that access
to abortion is a religious and moral imperative. In 1971, a number of ethical and religious
organizations joined together in a motion to file an amici curiae brief to oppose the laws
LQ7H[DVDQG*HRUJLDWKDW³LQWHUIHUH>G@ZLWKWKHOLEHUW\RIWKHLQGLYLGXDOWRH[HUFLVH . .
her own conscience in the conduct of . . KHUSHUVRQDOOLIH´$OWKRXJKWKHEULHIIRFXVHGRQ
WKH³ULJKWRIDQLQGLYLGXDOWREHIUHHIURP6WDWHLQWHUIHUHQFHin the conduct of his or her
SULYDWH OLIH´ EULHIV IURP UHOLJLRXV RUJDQL]DWLRQV LQ ODWHU DERUWLRQ FDVHV PRUH GLUHFWO\

229. McCammon, supra note 227.
230. Id.
231. History, RELIGIOUS COAL. FOR REPROD. CHOICE, http://rcrc.org/history (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
232. Id.
233. Pastoral Care Training, RELIGIOUS COAL. FOR REPROD. CHOICE, http://rcrc.org/pastoral-care, (last
visited Jan. 30, 2017).
234. Id.
235. See %ULHIIRU-XGVRQ0HP¶O&KXUFKHWDODV$PLFL&XULDH6XSSRUWLQJ3HWLWLRQHUV:KROH:RPDQ¶V+HDOWK
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (No. 15-274), 2016 WL 155634 [hereinafter Religious
2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶$PLFL&XULDH%ULHIIRU:KROH:RPDQ¶V+HDOWK@
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, GENERAL SYNOD STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS REGARDING FREEDOM
OF CHOICE 1 (1971), http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/unitedchurchofchrist/legacy_url/2038/GSResolutions-Freedon-of-Choice.pdf?1418425637 (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
241. Right
to
Choose:
1987
General
Resolution, UNITARIAN
UNIVERSALIST ASS¶N,
https://www.uua.org/action/statements/right-choose (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/8

26

Rush: Religious Freedom and Self-Induced Abortion

2019]

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

517

address the role of religion in abortion access and decision-making. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, Catholics for a Free Choice, Chicago Catholic Women, the
National Coalition of American Nuns, and the Women of Spirit in Colorado Task Force
filed a brief in support of Reproductive Health Services. 242 In the brief, the organizations
DVVHUWHG WKDW WKHUH LV QRW D ³FRQVWDQW WHDFKLQJ LQ &DWKROLF WKHRORJ\´ UHJDUGLQJ WKH
³FRPPHQFHPHQWRISHUVRQKRRG´243 7KHRUJDQL]DWLRQVDUJXHGWKDWWKH&DWKROLF&KXUFK¶V
WKHRU\RISUREDELOLVPSURYLGHVWKDW³LIWKHUHH[LVWVDUHDOO\probabl[e] opinion in favor of
liberty . . . although the opinion in favor of the law is more probable I may use the former
RSLQLRQDQGGLVUHJDUGWKHODWWHU´244 Thus, the writers asserted that issues regarding moral
decision-PDNLQJ OLHV ZLWKLQ WKH FRQVFLHQFH RI HDFK LQGLYLGXDO DQG WKDW LQGLYLGXDO¶V
conscious choice is supreme. BasHGRQWKHDPLFL¶VDUJXPHQWDFDUHJLYHU¶VPRUDOFKRLFH
or imperative to assist with self-induced abortion resides within herself and she must
follow that decision.
Most recently, theologians and a number of religious organizations and
congregations discussed religious support for access to abortion. In Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, more than fifteen religious organizations submitted a brief in support
RI:KROH:RPDQ¶V+HDOWK245 In the brief, the religious organizations and congregations
state that there is not a unified religious or moral position on abortion, even among major
religions.246 7KHUHIRUHDVWDWH¶VDWWHPSWWRUHVWULFWWKHDFFHVVLELOLW\RIDERUWLRQQHFHVVDULO\
impinges on the religious and moral decisions of some individuals. Theologians, ethicists,
and those who teach theology across a wide spectrum of religions also submitted a brief
LQVXSSRUWRI:KROH:RPDQ¶V+HDOWK 247 ,QWKHEULHIWKHWKHRORJLDQVDVVHUWHGWKDW7H[DV¶V
UHVWULFWLRQV RQ DERUWLRQ DFFHVV ZHUH ³PDQLIHVWO\ XQMXVW DQG LPPRUDO XQGer theological
WHQHWV´EHFDXVHWKHUHVWULFWLRQVXQGXO\EXUGHQHGZRPHQLQSRYHUW\DQGSXWWKHPDWULVN
for unsafe abortion procedures.248
2QLWVIDFHUHOLJLRXVVXSSRUWIRUDSHUVRQ¶VDELOLW\WRFKRRVHDQDERUWLRQGRHVQRW
demonstrate a religious imperative to assist with abortion. However, a number of religious
followers and leaders have expressed that they support access to abortion because of their
religion. Often, there is an assumption that people of faith who support access to abortion
GRVRZLWK³PRUDOUHFNRQLQJ´249 In addition, there is typically an assumption that there
242. See Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), 1989 WL 1127718.
243. Id. at 5.
244. Id. at 20.
245. See 5HOLJLRXV2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶$PLFL&XULDH%ULHIIRU:KROH:RPDQ¶V+HDOWKsupra note 235.
246. Id. at 3.
247. %ULHIIRU7KHRORJLDQVDQG(WKLFLVWV6XSSRUWLQJ3HWLWLRQHUVDW:KROH:RPDQ¶V+HDOWKY&ROH)G
563 (2015) (No. 15-272), 2015 WL 9610345.
248. Id. at 1, 3. Ultimately, the amici curiae brief on behalf of the theologians and ethicists was filed in support
RI:KROH:RPDQ¶V+HDOWKLQWhole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. However, at the time of the initial filings
in 2015, Kirk Cole served as the Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services.
SCOTUSBLOG, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/wholewomans-health-v-cole (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). By the time the case reached the Supreme Court in 2016,
John Hellerstedt served as the Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services. Id.
249. Katey Zeh, The Intersections of Faith and Reproductive Justice, FEMINISM AND RELIGION (July 18,
2017), https://feminismandreligion.com/2017/07/18/the-intersections-of-faith-and-reproductive-justice-by-kate
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DUH ³VFULSWXUDO DQG HWKLFDO FRQIOLFWV´ LQ H[LVWHQFH WKDW PXVW EH RYHUFRPH E\ SHRSOH RI
faith.250 However, religious leaders and groups have argued that their support for abortion
access is QRW³LQVSLWHRIUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIV´EXWLVGXHWRWKHLUUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVDVZHOO
as the belief that reproductive rights are an important element of religious leadership. 251
:LWKRXW ³IXOO DQG UREXVW DFFHVV WR  .  DERUWLRQ´ WKRVH UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV Dre
compromised.252 Specifically, some rabbis state that the Jewish community has a
³>U@HVSRQVLELOLW\WRHQVXUHWKDWDOOSHRSOHFDQDFFHVVFRPSUHKHQVLYHUHSURGXFWLYHKHDOWK
VHUYLFHV´253 7KHVHUDEELVWHOOWKDW³-HZLVKWUDGLWLRQcommands [people] to respect [their]
ERGLHV DQG WR VWULYH IRU KHDOWK DV D PHDQV RI KRQRULQJ >RQH¶V@ UHODWLRQVKLS WR *RG´ 254
)XUWKHUWKH\DVVHUWWKDW³-HZLVKODZWHDFK>HV@WKDWDERUWLRQLVERWKPRUDODQGFRUUHFWZKHQ
DZRPDQ¶VPHQWDORUSK\VLFDOKHDOWKLVWKUHDWHQHG´ 255
But the story of Dr. Willie Parker provides the most compelling evidence that
individuals may assist with abortion due to religious or spiritual imperative. Dr. Parker
holds a degree from the University of Iowa College of Medicine as well as degrees from
the Harvard School of Public Health, the University of Cincinnati, and the University of
Michigan.256 Recently, the United Nations Office of Human Rights recognized him as one
RIWZHOYH:RPHQ¶V+XPDQ 5LJKWV'HIHQGHUV 257 But most importantly, Dr. Parker is a
devout Christian who chooses to provide abortions in high-need communities because of
his religious convictions. 258
For much of his young life, Dr. Parker identified as a fundamentalist Christian and
wrote about abortioQDVD³OLIH-HQGLQJSURFHVV´259 Indeed, Dr. Parker refused to perform
abortions for the first half of his career as an OB/GYN. 260 As part of his profession, he
referred patients seeking abortion to appropriate providers, but believed that performing
abortions himself was wrong. However, he describes his transition from fundamentalist
DERUWLRQRSSRQHQWWR&KULVWLDQDERUWLRQSURYLGHUDVD³PRUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ 261 When a
series of life events forced Dr. Parker to reflect on his stance toward abortion, he found
Rev'U0DUWLQ/XWKHU.LQJ-U¶VVHUPRQ³,¶YH%HHQWRWKH0RXQWDLQWRS´SDUWLFXODUO\
moving.262 Although Dr. Parker had heard the sermon countless times, one specific
LQVWDQFHFDOOHGKLPWRUHIOHFWRQWKRVHZRPHQZKRDUH³GHQLHGWKHKHDOWK-care services
y-zeh.
250. Id.
251. Lori Weinstein & Rabbi Michael Nammath, Our Jewish beliefs call us to advocate for reproductive
rights, WASH. JEWISH WEEK (Jan. 25, 2017), http://washingtonjewishweek.com/36072/our-jewish-beliefs-callus-to-advocate-for-reproductive-rights/editorial-opinion/voices.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. About Dr. Parker, DR. WILLIE PARKER, https://www.drwillieparker.com/about (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
257. Id.
258. Id. Dr. Parker provides abortions in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. Currently,
Mississippi has only one abortion clinic.
259. DR. WILLIE PARKER, LIFE¶S WORK: A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR CHOICE 2, 24±25 (2017).
260. Id. at 26.
261. Id. at 2.
262. Id. at 34.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/8

28

Rush: Religious Freedom and Self-Induced Abortion

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

2019]

519

they sRXJKWEHFDXVHRIVRPHRQHHOVH¶VLGHDRIZKDWWKH\VKRXOGGR´263 As he reflected,
Dr. Parker found the story of the Good Samaritan analogous to a calling to provide abortion
services.264 In discussing this transition, Dr. Parker writes:
The Scripture came alive and it spoke to me. For the Samaritan, the person in need was a
fallen traveler. For me, it was a pregnant woman. The earth spun, and with it, this question
turned on its head. It became not: Is it right for me, as a Christian, to perform abortions? But
rather: Is it right for me, as a Christian, to refuse to do them? And in that instant, I understood
that I, like the Levite and the priest, had been afraid²afraid of what my Christian brothers
and sisters might think of me, of what my pastors and relatives . . . might say, of what the
social or political consequences of fully embracing the cause of abortion might be.265

Today, Dr. Parker describes his work as an abortion provider as a calling, despite
the abashment of his Christian opponents.266 In discussing hLVFDOOLQJKHVWDWHV³,DPD
Christian, raised in the churches right here in the South . . . I remain a follower of Jesus.
$QG,EHOLHYHWKDWDVDQDERUWLRQSURYLGHU,DPGRLQJ*RG¶VZRUN´ 267
0DQ\LQGLYLGXDOV¶UHOLJLRXVSUDFWLFHVDQGEHOLHIVGRQRWFRPSHO actions similar to
WKH*RRG6DPDULWDQ+RZHYHUZKHQFRQVLGHULQJUHOLJLRXVJURXSV¶DQGOHDGHUV¶ historical
acceptance of abortion, alongside outspoken support for making religious beliefs and
practice inclusive of abortion today, there is a strong indication that a caregiver could
demonstrate that her assistance with self-induced abortion is based on a sincere religious
belief :KHWKHU RU QRW WKH FDUHJLYHU¶V DVVLVWDQFH LV GHHPHG UHDVRQDEOH WR D SURVHFXWRU
judge, or jury is completely irrelevant, as the Hobby Lobby &RXUWUHDIILUPHGWKDWDSHUVRQ¶V
religious beliefs and practices are not required to meet a reasonableness standard. 268
2. &ULPLQDO&KDUJHV3RVHD6XEVWDQWLDO%XUGHQRQWKH&DUHJLYHU¶V5HOLJLRXV)UHH
Exercise
After the caregiver shows she acted because of her sincerely held religious beliefs,
the caregiver must demonstrate that the criminal charges she faces pose a substantial
burden on her religious exercise. In Hobby Lobby WKH &RXUW IRXQG WKDW WKH FODLPDQW¶V
UHOLJLRQZDVVXEVWDQWLDOO\EXUGHQHGE\WKHFRVWVUHVXOWLQJIURPWKHFRUSRUDWLRQV¶IDLOXUHWR
comply with the contraceptive mandate. 269 To the Court, the cumulative financial penalties
constituted a substantial burden because they made the practice of the clDLPDQWV¶UHOLJLRXV
beliefs more expensive.270 Hence, it is equally acceptable to find that a state imposes a
VXEVWDQWLDOEXUGHQRQDFDUHJLYHU¶VUHOLJLRXVSUDFWLFHZKHQDVWDWH¶VDFWLRQVSXWKHUOLEHUW\
and economic livelihood at risk.
Recall the story of Jennifer Whalen²the mother of three who purchased abortion

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 35.
PARKER, supra note 259, at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1±2.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724±25 (2014).
Id. at 718±22.
Id.
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SLOOV DQG DGPLQLVWHUHG WKHP WR KHU WHHQDJH GDXJKWHU SHU KHU GDXJKWHU¶V UHTXHVW 271
Although Whalen did not assert RFRA as a defense, her prosecution and subsequent
incarceration are indicative of the burdens a caregiver would likely experience. First,
:KDOHQ¶VFKDUJHVSXWKHULQDSRVLWLRQRIKDYLQJWRFKRRVHEHWZHHQSRWHQWLDOO\SUHVHUYLQJ
her liberty with an affirmative defense or pleading guilty and losing her livelihood. 272 If
Whalen pled guilty to the misdemeanors of assault and endangering the welfare of a child,
she would receive less jail time. But, in addition to incarceration, she would automatically
lose her position as a personal-care aide at an assisted living facility²a source of income
on which her family depended.273 Ultimately, Whalen pled guilty to the misdemeanor
charges and was sentenced to jail with work-release.274 Along with the economic costs,
Whalen experienced a great deal of unwanted and unwarranted attention. After her arrest,
bloggers, reporters, and pro-choice activists bombarded her with phone calls.
8QGRXEWHGO\WKHOHYHORIDWWHQWLRQ:KDOHQ¶VFDVHUHFHLYHGKDGDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQKHU
life²her family resides in a rural, conservative area where she has lived her entire life. 275
Similar to Whalen, a caregiver would likely face economic penalties and loss of
liberty. If a caregiver is charged and sentenced to prison for the unauthorized practice of
medicine, she likely encounters fines relating to the violation of the statute 276 as well as
fees relating to imprisonment, court costs, community service, and bail.277 In addition to
expenses directly related to her criminal charges, a caregiver would also likely endure the
collateral consequences of incarceration²job loss, civil forfeiture, and limitation of
welfare benefits.278 $FDUHJLYHU¶VSK\VLFDOUHVWUDLQWDOVRLPSRVHVDVXEVWDQWLDOEXUGHQRQ
her religious exercise because it limits her ability to assist women with self-induced
abortion. If a caregiver is incarcerated, she is not able to act as a Good Samaritan by
ordering abortion pills or traditional herbs and by ensuring that such treatments are taken
in a safe and effective manner. Thus, Hobby Lobby’s penalty-based reasoning provides
that the requirements for what constitutes a substantial burden are met simply by a
FDUHJLYHU¶VSURVHFXWLRQDQGLQFDUFHUDWLRQ
3. Abortion Case Law Provides that the State has a Compelling Interest
After a caregiver demonstrates that the state imposed a substantial burden on her
religious exercise, the prosecution must show that the state had a compelling interest in
doing so. Although the Court in Hobby Lobby assumed the government had a compelling
interest to ensure the provision of cost-free contraception to female workers, it remarked
that broadly formulated government interests, such as public health or gender equality, are

271. See Bazelon, supra note 199.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Bazelon, supra note 199.
276. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.  SURYLGLQJWKDWDQ\SHUVRQZKRYLRODWHV,OOLQRLV¶VXQDXWKRUL]HGSUDFWLFH
of medicine statute may face a fine of up to $10,000 for their first offense).
277. See Salma S. Safiedine & K. Jeannie Chung, The Price for Justice: The Economic Barriers That
Contribute to an Unfair and Unjust Criminal Justice System, 32 CRIM. JUST. 40, 44 (2018).
278. See Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, 16 CRIM. JUST. 32 (2001).
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not emblematic of a compelling state interest. 279 Instead, the compelling interest inquiry
requires a more narrow examination.280 When the government asserts a compelling interest
for substanWLDOO\ EXUGHQLQJ WKH FODLPDQW¶V RU GHIHQGDQW¶V religious exercise, the
JRYHUQPHQWPXVWVKRZWKDWWKH³WHVWLVVDWLVILHGWKURXJK>WKH@DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHFKDOOHQJHG
ODZµWRWKHSHUVRQ¶´281 $VDUHVXOWFRXUWVVKRXOGDSSO\VWULFWVFUXWLQ\WRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
assertion that harm will result from granting the claimant or defendant a religious
exemption from the law.282
When a caregiver is prosecuted, the government could assert that the harm resulting
from her religious exemption is the risk of medical complications or death to the person
who chooses to self-induce. Indeed, abortion was legalized in part because of the high
mortality rates associated with illegal abortions that were unsanitary and not properly
performed by physicians.283 However, the advent and increased usage of medication
abortion allows for caregivers to safely assist people with abortion outside of a clinical
setting.284
In a study on self-induced abortion, the use of abortion medLFDWLRQZDVWKH³PRVW
commonly reported method among women who reported knowing someone who had
DWWHPSWHG´VHOI-induced abortion.285 Similar to many medications, abortion pills include a
list of side effects such as nausea, vomiting, weakness, or dizziness. 286 Yet, the most recent
data indicates that when abortion medication is taken properly, serious adverse reactions
occur in less than one percent of individuals. 287 Further, over ninety-seven percent of
pregnancies treated with abortion pills successfully terminate.288 After taking the abortion
medication, less than three percent of people are required to undergo additional abortion
procedures to end the pregnancy.289 ,QOLJKWRIWKHVHIDFWVWKHVWDWH¶VFRPSHOOLQJLQWHUHVW
in preventing medical complications or death would be minimized if individuals could
legally obtain legitimate abortion pills. But currently, access to abortion medication in the
U.S. is limited to physician prescriptions. 290 Without additional information on how many
people who self-induce actually receive legitimate abortion medication, it is far too
279. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724±25 (2014).
280. Id.
281. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430±31 (2006)).
282. Id. (relying on Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431).
283. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
284. D. Grossman, K White, & L. Fuentes et al., Knowledge, Opinion and Experience Related to Abortion
Self-Induction in Texas, TEX. POL¶Y EVALUATION PROJECT RES. BRIEF 1 (Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter
³Knowledge, Opinion, and Experience´]; Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.guttmacher.org/print/evidence-you-can-use/medication-abortion. See also Mifeprex Medication
Guide, stating that althouJK³>V@HULRXVLQIHFWLRQKDVUHVXOWHGLQGHDWKLQDYHU\VPDOOQXPEHURIFDVHV . . There
LVQRLQIRUPDWLRQWKDWXVHRI0LIHSUH[DQGPLVRSURVWROFDXVHGWKHVHGHDWKV´)'$Mifeprex Medication Guide,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/UCM088643.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
285. Knowledge, Opinion, and Experience, supra note 284, at 3.
286. FDA,
Mifeprex
(Mifepristone)
Label
7
(2016),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/020687s020lbl.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
287. Id. at 7±8.
288. Id. at 13 tbl.3.
289. Id.
290. Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm111323.htm
(last updated Jan. 23, 2018); Knowledge, Opinion, and Experience, supra note 284, at 3.
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ambitious to conclude that a court would not find a compelling interest in preventing
medical complications or death in people who choose to self-induce with abortion pills
purchased via internet or through mail-order.
Abortion exceptionalism further complicates the compelling state interest analysis
EHFDXVHLWLVXQFOHDUZKHWKHUDFRXUWZRXOGLQWHUSUHW5)5$¶VFRPSHOOLQJVWDWHLQWHUHVWWHVW
through the lens of abortion case law. 291 In Roe, the Court held that during the first
trimester of a pregnancy, the state has no compelling interest and the abortion decision
PXVW EH OHIW WR WKH SHUVRQ DQG WKDW LQGLYLGXDO¶V SK\VLFLDQ 292 But, at later stages of
pregnancy, the state has a compelling interest in seeing that abortion is performed under
circumstances that ensure maximum safety for the patient. 293 )RULQVWDQFH³D6WDWHPD\
properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical
VWDQGDUGVDQGLQSURWHFWLQJSRWHQWLDOOLIH´ 294
While Roe articulated the need for a state to have a compelling interest in regulating
abortion beyond the first trimester, later cases depressed the Roe holding and eventually
abandoned the practice of applying strict scrutiny to all abortion regulations. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, the Court held that the state has a compelling interest in
protecting fetal life from the moment of conception. 295 Building on the Webster ruling, the
Casey &RXUWVWDWHGWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDVD³SURIRXQGLQWHUHVW´LQSRWHntial life and may
regulate abortion at the earliest stages of pregnancy, so long as the regulation does not
SRVH DQ XQGXH EXUGHQ RQ WKH SHUVRQ¶V ULJKW WR WHUPLQDWH D SUHJQDQF\ 296 7KH VWDWH¶V
profound interests also allow it to regulate abortion to protect the health and safety of the
individual.297 Most recently, the Court echoed previous cases when it held that states are
not required to assert a compelling interest for abortion regulations to be constitutional. In
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the CoXUWUHDIILUPHGWKDWVWDWHVKDYHD³OHJLWLPDWH
interest in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed under circumstances that insure
PD[LPXPVDIHW\IRUWKHSDWLHQW´ VRORQJDVWKHVWDWHUHJXODWLRQVGRQRWSRVHD³VXEVWDQWLDO
obstacle to a woman seeking DQDERUWLRQ´298
%HFDXVHDFDUHJLYHU¶VDUUHVWDQGSURVHFXWLRQGLUHFWO\LQYROYHVDERUWLRQDQGZRXOG
likely violate existing abortion restrictions, it is unclear whether a court would require the

291. See supra 3DUW,,,$DQGQRWHVWR$ERUWLRQH[FHSWLRQDOLVPRFFXUVZKHQ³OLWLJDQWVKDYHDOOHJHG
constitutional claims other than . . XQGXHEXUGHQYLRODWLRQV´DQGLQUHVSRQVHFRXUWVDGMXVW³KRZWKH\QRUPDOO\
analyze these constitutional claims or they have even completely foreclosed the application of other doctrines on
WKHJURXQGVWKDWWKHXQGXHEXUGHQVWDQGDUGVXEVXPHVRUGLVSODFHVWKHVHFODLPV´&DLWOLQ(%RUJPDQQAbortion
Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2014). In the context of
WKLVSDSHUDERUWLRQH[FHSWLRQDOLVPUHIHUVWRWKHFRXUW¶VFRXUVHRIDFWLRQLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHOHYHORIVFUXWLQ\WR
apply to constitutional claims brought alongside abortion rights violations. However, it is not inconceivable that
a caregiver asserting a RFRA as a defense would also assert a First Amendment free exercise violation, or even
a violation of abortion rights based on privacy. In such a case, the actual level of scrutiny the court may apply to
the RFRA claim is very uncertain.
292. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162±63 (1973).
293. Id. at 154, 163.
294. Id. at 154
295. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 494 (1989).
296. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877±78 (1992).
297. Id.
298. Whole Woman¶V+HDOWKY+HOOHUVWHGW6&W   TXRWLQJRoe, 410 U.S. at 150).
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state to demonstrate a compelling interest or to only articulate a legitimate interest.
Moreover, a court may review abortion jurisprudence and find a compelling state interest
in protecting the life and health of the pregnant person or preserving potential human life.
Because courts have been inconsistent in the standard of review they apply, great caution
is warranted, as is a conservative approach when predicting whether the court will find a
compelling state interest.
4. Arresting and Prosecuting Caregivers is Not the Least Restrictive Means
Although a court could conclude that the state has a compelling interest, the state
must also show that it is furthering its interest by the least restrictive means possible. To
VDWLVI\WKLVVWDQGDUGWKHVWDWHPXVWGHPRQVWUDWH³WKDWLWODFNVRWKHUPHDQVRIDFKLHYLQJLWV
desired JRDO ZLWKRXW LPSRVLQJ D VXEVWDQWLDO EXUGHQ RQ WKH H[HUFLVH RI UHOLJLRQ´ 299 In
Hobby Lobby, the Court assumed the government had a compelling interest in substantially
EXUGHQLQJWKHFODLPDQWV¶religious exercise. However, the government did not satisfy the
least restrictive means standard because it did not anticipate other ways of furthering its
interest and did not demonstrate why those alternatives would have been unworkable. 300
To show that any substitute means of furthering its interests was unfeasible, the
government could have used empirical evidence. Such evidence might include an
³HVWLPDWHRIWKHDYHUDJHFRVWSHUHPSOR\HHRUSURYLGLQJDFFHVVWR . FRQWUDFHSWLYHV´RU
³VWDWLVWLFVUHJDUGLQJWKHQXPEHURIHPSOR\HHVZKRPLJKWEHDIIHFWHG´ 301
Absent any proposal from the government, the Court suggested two alternatives to
the contraceptive mandate. First, the Court speculated that the government could fund the
cost of the four contraceptive methods at issue. While the government argued that RFRA
cannot be used to create new programs, the Court rejected this reasoning and held that
³5)5$ . . may in some circumstances require the Government to expend additional funds
WR DFFRPPRGDWH FLWL]HQV¶ UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV´302 Second, the Court pointed out that the
governPHQW ³LWVHOI KDV GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW LW KDV DW LWV GLVSRVDO DQ DSSURDFK WKDW LV OHVV
UHVWULFWLYH´303 The government had already provided nonprofit religious organizations
with a religious exemption for contraceptive coverage. 304 The Court held that the religious
H[HPSWLRQ SURYLGHG WR QRQSURILWV GLG QRW VXEVWDQWLDOO\ EXUGHQ WKH FODLPDQWV¶ UHOLJLRXV
EHOLHIDQGDOVRIXUWKHUHGWKHVWDWH¶VFRPSHOOLQJLQWHUHVWLQHQVXULQJFRQWUDFHSWLYHFRYHUDJH
to female employees.305
When a state prosecutes and penalizes a caregiver who assists with self-induced
abortion due to religious motivations, it is not furthering its compelling interest by the least
restrictive means possible. While the state may have a compelling interest, it can
simultaneously ensure that religious exercise is not burdened and that pregnant people are

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 727±28 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 727±30
Id. at 729±30.
Id. at 730±32.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 730±32.
Id.
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protected. Although the caregiver is not obligated to demonstrate alternative means by
which the state could further its compelling interest, it is worth exploring what avenues
the state could take to do so.
Because access to abortion medication is highly restricted, states do not have the
authority to broaden how abortion medication is prescribed and dispensed. 306 However, a
state can mitigate potential harms and meet its compelling interest by creating an
exemption for religiously-motivated caregiving either under existing abortion statutes or
under existing medical licensure regulations. Although there are no laws granting religious
exemptions specifically for self-induced abortion caregivers, many states offer religious
exemptions to withhold from otherwise mandatory medical treatments. For instance,
despite recent outbreaks of measles and mumps, 307 many immunization statutes allow for
religious exemptions.308 In addition, eighteen states grant philosophical exemptions for
individuals who object to vaccinations due to a moral or personal belief. 309
Some states also offer religious exemptions from medical licensure in certain
situations, which indicates that prosecuting caregivers for administering traditional herbs
or abortion medication is not the least restrictive means of preventing medical
FRPSOLFDWLRQVRUGHDWK,Q)ORULGDWKRVHZKRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKH³GRPHVWLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ
RIUHFRJQL]HGIDPLO\UHPHGLHV´RU³>W@Ke practice of the religious tenets of any church in
WKLVVWDWH´DUHH[HPSWIURPVRPHRIWKHSURYLVLRQVLQ)ORULGD¶V5HJXODWLRQRI3URIHVVLRQV
and Occupations Code.310 *HRUJLD¶V 3URIHVVLRQV DQG %XVLQHVVHV ODZV DOVR DOORZ IRU D
religious exemption to practice PHGLFLQH8QGHU*HRUJLD¶VPHGLFDOSUDFWLFHSURYLVLRQV
WKH ODZ SURYLGHV WKDW PHGLFDO SUDFWLFH VWDWXWHV GR QRW SURKLELW ³>W@KH SUDFWLFH RI WKH
UHOLJLRXVWHQHWVRUJHQHUDOEHOLHIVRIDQ\FKXUFKZKDWVRHYHU´311 However, some states that
306. DANCO LABS., LLC, Mifeprex Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (Mar. 2016),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifeprex_2016-03-29_REMS_full.pdf. ,GHDOO\DVWDWH¶V
least restrictive means to protecting the health of people who undergo self-induced abortion would manifest
WKURXJKDPHQGPHQWVWRWKHVWDWH¶VSKDUPDF\GLVSHQVDWLRQODZV)RULQVWDQFHDVWDWHFRXOGDPHQGLWVODZVWR
provide that pharmacists may prescribe and dispense abortion medication to any person in need of it. A state
could ostensibly couple this strategy with the Hobby Lobby &RXUW¶VJRYHUQPHQW-pays proposal. Because RFRAs
DOORZVWDWHVWR³H[SHQGDGGLWLRQDOIXQGVWRDFFRPPRGDWHFLWL]HQV¶UHOLJLRXVEHOLHIV´ a state could subsidize the
cost of abortion medication through its Medicaid program in order to guarantee that poverty is not a barrier to
safe and effective medication. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729±30. However, only a physician who is certified
ZLWKWKH)'$¶V5LVN(YDOXDWLRQDQG0LWLJDWLRQ6WUDWHJy program can prescribe and dispense the medication.
DANCO LABS., LLC, Mifeprex Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (Mar. 2016),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifeprex_2016-03-29_REMS_full.pdf. Further, in some
states, a person must take the first pill of two in the physical presence of a clinician. Medication Abortion,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/medication-abortion.
While the ACLU is currently challenging the federal government¶V UHVWULFWLRQV RQ DERUWLRQ PHGLFDWLRQ WKH
expectation that states can expand pharmacy dispensation laws to encompass the medication is currently
unworkable. ACLU, ACLU Challenges Federal Restrictions on Abortion Pill (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-challenges-federal-restrictions-abortion-pill.
307. NAT¶L CONF. OF ST. LEGS., LegisBrief: Vaccination Policies: Requirements and Exemptions for Entering
School 1 (Dec. 2017) [hereinafter Vaccination Policies].
308. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53G-9-303(2), 304(iii)(b); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.001(c)(1)(B);
IDAHO CODE § 39-4802(2); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-8.1(8); IND. CODE § 21-40-5-6(a); see also Vaccination
Policies, supra note 307, at 2.
309. See Vaccination Policies, supra note 307, at 2.
310. FLA. STAT. § 458.303(f)±(g).
311. GA. CODE. ANN. § 43-34-22(b)(2).
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allow for religious exemptions to medical licensure or treatment laws qualify the
exemption by prohibiting the administration of controlled or prescribed substances. Under
California law, an individual may practice healing arts or alternative medicine so long as
the individual satisfies certain disclosure requirements and does not perform surgery or
³>S@UHVFULEH>@RUDGPLQLVWHU>@ . FRQWUROOHGVXEVWDQFHVWRDQRWKHUSHUVRQ´312 Similarly,
1RUWK&DUROLQDDOORZVIRUWKH³DGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIGRPHVWLFRUIDPLO\UHPHGLHV´EXWGRHV
not peUPLW WUHDWLQJ RWKHUV E\ ³VSLULWXDO PHDQV´ LI GUXJV RU RWKHU ³PDWHULDO PHDQV´ DUH
used.313
Following Hobby Lobby¶VUHDVRQLQJHYLGHQFHWKDWUHOLJLRXVH[HPSWLRQVDUHDOUHDG\
provided under the law in question is sufficient to show that a state has a less restrictive
means of furthering its compelling interest rather than prosecuting a caregiver who assists
with self-induced abortion. Similar to how Hobby Lobby broadened the religious
exemption in the contraceptive mandate to include for-profit corporations, the existence
of a religious exception under medical licensure laws shows that expanding the statutes to
include additional groups is not an unworkable alternative. Further, broadening religious
H[HPSWLRQV SUHVHUYHV WKH FDUHJLYHU¶V religious exercise. As a result, a state has less
restrictive means to protect the health and safety of pregnant people aside from prosecuting
and convicting caregivers who assist with self-induced abortion due to a religious or
spiritual motivation.
V. CONCLUSION
As described above, a caregiver who assists another with self-induced abortion may
face criminal charges under unauthorized practice of medicine laws. However, if a
caregiver assists in self-induced abortion due to a religious or spiritual motivation, she
should assert as a defense a violation of her right to religious exercise under a state RFRA.
A caregiver should raise her defense under a state RFRA because it affords broader
protections than does the First Amendment. Unlike the First Amendment, state RFRAs
protect religiously- or spiritually-motivated conduct even when the substantial burden on
WKH FDUHJLYHU¶V religious exercise arises from a neutral law of general applicability. In
FRQWUDVWWKH)LUVW$PHQGPHQWRQO\SURWHFWVIUHHH[HUFLVHZKHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDFWLRQ
tDUJHWVDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VUHOLJLRXVSUDFWLFH )XUWKHU PDQ\VWDWH5)5$VSURYLGHWKDWVWDWH
DFWLRQV WKDW FUHDWH DQ LQGLUHFW EXUGHQ RQ D FDUHJLYHU¶V religious exercise constitute a
substantial burden.
Yet, some factors complicate how a state court will interpreWLWVVWDWH¶V5)5$6WDWH
RFRA cases are infrequent, particularly in the criminal defense context. In addition, each
RFRA is uniquely drafted. Consequently, state courts sometimes fail to apply strict
scrutiny to RFRA defenses and claims, making a successful outcome for a caregiver
unpredictable. Despite uncertainties, the paucity of state RFRA case law places an
emphasis on federal interpretations of RFRA. Some state courts have already begun to rely
on federal sources of authority when adjudicating state RFRA defenses and claims.
Further, recent decisions indicate that, when adjudicating criminal or civil RFRA issues,

312. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2053.5.
313. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18(c)(1) to (5).
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VRPHVWDWHFRXUWVDUHDSSO\LQJWKH5)5$DQDO\VLVIURPWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VHobby Lobby
decision. Thus, a state court could DSSO\WKH&RXUW¶V5)5$DQDO\VLVLQHobby Lobby to a
FDUHJLYHU¶VRFRA defense.
The RFRA analysis in Hobby Lobby is advantageous to a caregiver who is charged
ZLWK WKH XQDXWKRUL]HG SUDFWLFH RI PHGLFLQH )LUVW WKH &RXUW QRWHG WKDW IHGHUDO 5)5$¶V
definition of religious exercise is far more expansive than that under the First Amendment.
8QGHU5)5$¶VGHILQLWLRQFDUHJLYLQJIRULQGLYLGXDOVZKRVHOI-induce abortion can easily
be placed within the context of religion²religious and spiritual leaders have assisted
women in obtaining abortions for decades. In addition, some individuals provide abortion
services specifically because they have been spiritually called to do so. Accordingly, the
assertion that providing abortion care may fit within the definition of free exercise is
sound.
Next, Hobby Lobby’s definition of what constitutes a substantial burden is broad; it
includes indirect burdens on free exercise such as economic penalties. A state places a
VXEVWDQWLDOEXUGHQRQDFDUHJLYHU¶VIUHHH[HUFLVHZKHQLWFKDUJHs her with a statute such as
the unauthorized practice of medicine. If incarcerated, a caregiver is completely prohibited
from assisting with self-induced abortion. In addition to limitations on her physical liberty,
a caregiver also faces heavy fines related to the violation of the statute.
Finally, the Hobby Lobby decision details what is required of a state to demonstrate
that its actions are the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest. Similar
WRWKH&RXUW¶VKROGLQJLQHobby Lobby, a state court would likely determine that a state
KDGDFRPSHOOLQJLQWHUHVWLQVXEVWDQWLDOO\EXUGHQLQJDFDUHJLYHU¶VDELOLW\WRDVVLVWZLWKVHOIinduced abortion. However, a state would likely fail to satisfy a court that prosecuting and
convicting a caregiver was the least restrictive means of furthering its interest. Under
Hobby Lobby, a state is required to prove that it lacked an alternative means to further its
LQWHUHVW3DUWRIDVWDWH¶VEXUGHQLQFOXGHVOLVWLQJZKDWRWKHUDYHQXHVDVWDWHPLJKWWDNH and
describing why those alternatives are inviable. Specifically, if a state already provides a
religious exemption under an unauthorized practice of medicine statute, it must show why
expanding the statute to include caregivers is unworkable. Thus, when a state fails to prove
WKDWVXFKDQH[SDQVLRQLVLPSUDFWLFDEOHDVWDWH¶VDUJXPHQWZLOOIORXQGHUDQGDFDUHJLYHU
will have successfully asserted the RFRA as a criminal defense.
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